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Abstract  
Idealised land markets and real needs: the experience of landless people 
seeking land in the Northern and Western Cape through the market-based land 
reform programme 
 
Magister Philosophiae Thesis, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University 
of the Western Cape 
 
S. M. Tilley   
 
This thesis interrogates the claim that resource-poor, rural land seekers can acquire 
land through the land market which constitutes the central mechanism of land 
redistribution in South Africa’s market-based land reform programme. The study 
explores two key aspects in relation to this claim. Firstly, it provides a critique of the 
underlying assumptions prevalent in much of the current market-based land reform 
policy, as advocated by its national and international proponents, and the manner in 
which the market as a mechanism for land redistribution has been conceptualized 
and its outcomes envisaged. Secondly, it considers the extent to which this 
conceptualization - which it is argued, draws on idealized and abstracted notions of 
land market functioning - is realized and examines the extent to which the espoused 
outcomes of market-based land reform policy are aligned with or contradicted by the 
functioning of real markets and the experiences of resource-poor land seeking 
people in their attempts to engage in the land market with limited state support. The 
details of the market’s operation are analysed, with a distinction made between the 
operational practice of real markets – based on direct evidence-based observation – 
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and degrees of policy abstraction and theoretical assumptions regarding how 
markets should or might operate. 
 
The study’s methodological framework draws on an agrarian political economy 
perspective, as used by theorists such as Akram-Lodhi (2007) and Courville (2005), 
amongst others. This perspective enables a consideration of the various contexts 
and socially embedded processes involved in land transactions and the extent to 
which these are shaped and framed by the politics of policy-making. In line with this 
perspective, the study focuses on the social relations brought to bear on the 
acquisition of land and the way in which land markets operate. It is suggested that 
land is not solely viewed as an economic commodity by land-seekers. Furthermore, 
it was found that markets cannot be understood as neutral institutions in which 
participants are equal players. 
 
The key research questions considered in this study are the following: 
• What are the operational dynamics of the land market? 
• How do these dynamics enable or hinder the acquisition of land by 
prospective land reform beneficiaries? 
• What has been the experience of those trying to acquire land through market-
based land reform? 
 
The study critiques the extent to which all the necessary components for enabling 
land market access and activity are present and considers the available scope for 
resource-poor rural land-seekers to engage in the land market with limited state 
support. The following synthesis of the key policy assumptions which underpin land 
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market transactions forms the basis of the critique, against which the findings 
regarding the operation of real land markets in the case study areas are matched: 
• A product or commodity (land) is available and is accompanied by a requisite 
response and level of activity in the land market;  
• Willing buyers and willing sellers exist and interactions and relationships of 
negotiation and exchange occur between these transactors;  
• The market is accessible and information is available to all;  
• Ready capital and financing is available for the purchase of land; 
• A regulatory framework exists.   
 
The findings provide an insight into the workings and efficacy of real land markets, 
based on an analysis of the title deeds for all agricultural land transactions over a 
five year period and within specified case study locations. These are compared with 
the espoused outcomes and principles underpinning market-based land policy, with 
its reliance on the land market as the primary mechanism for land redistribution. 
 
This study found that in general terms South Africa has an active land market and 
the necessary infrastructure and regulatory framework to support it – such as a 
systematised deeds registry, financial services and systems, professional land 
surveyors and valuators, and associated information networks. However, while 
noting a degree of land acquisition within specific locales, the Department of Land 
Affairs’ land reform programme and its accompanying provision of grants to 
prospective land reform beneficiaries, was found to be an inadequate response to 
the historical disparities, social inequalities and the socially embedded character of 
markets and land transactions.  Consequently, the majority of resource-poor and 
marginalised land-seekers are unable to access the land market and are therefore 
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unable to acquire land. For them, the notion of the land market and their ability to 
engage with it remains an abstraction, an unattainable ideal. Interaction with the land 
market thus remains the preserve of those who have access to resources, specific 
social networks, information and finance. 
 
The findings of this study point to a glaring gap between the State’s espoused policy 
and real practice, between what the market (as characterised within a range of 
idealised and real configurations) is expected to deliver and the extent to which the 
actual level of land acquisition by resource-poor land seekers has been made 
possible by the State’s response to land need and the implementation of its policy. In 
essence, this gap reflects a lack of integration between the spheres of what 
Bernstein (1994:3) refers to as ‘market logic’ and ‘bureaucratic action’. A number of 
the causal factors for this have emerged as findings in this study and are linked to a 
set of core issues. These focus on the politics of the process surrounding the State’s 
adoption of market-based land reform in the early 1990s; the manner in which the 
land market has been characterised in South African land reform policy and the 
implications of this for policy formulation and implementation; and the nature and 
level of support provided to would-be beneficiaries by the state.  
 
The fundamental conclusion of this study is that a land reform programme premised 
on the land market as the key determinant of land redistribution, accompanied by the 
provision of limited grants and services to enable land acquisition by the historically 
dispossessed and landless, offers negligible promise or benefit to the vast majority. It 
is argued that this failure of land reform should be recognised not so much as one of 
market-failure, but rather of policy failure in the first instance. 
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Idealised land markets and real needs: the experience of landless people 
seeking land in the Northern and Western Cape through the market-based land 
reform programme 
 
 
Chapter One – Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an historical overview of how South African land reform policy 
came to be informed by a market-based approach and includes a brief summary of 
the main features of the land reform programme. It also provides an overview of the 
key issues addressed in this study.   
 
International developments during the 1980s and 1990s precipitated profound 
changes that informed the nature and focus of land reform around the world. The 
rise of economic globalisation during these decades resulted in the integration of the 
world economy more explicitly, and emphasised a reliance on market forces and the 
deregulation of trade and the economy (International Union of Food Workers, 2001). 
These significant changes were underscored by the belief that sustainable growth is 
achievable through increasing trade and investment and the role of the private 
sector, with a reduction in state intervention in the management of the economy and 
in the provision and expenditure on social services and development (Bernstein, 
2002). Globalisation led to a shift in the world economy towards the ‘free-market’ and 
market forces came to be relied upon to shape and determine the path of the 
economy and the developmental needs of the population.  
 
The catchwords of ‘the market’ or the ‘free market’ became central to the 
international development discourse of the 1980s and, according to White (1993:1), 
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“took on virtually magical qualities as a developmental panacea. In the world of 
ideas, it was an intellectual juggernaut given political force (and therefore intellectual 
credibility) not only by the dominance of neo-liberalism in the key metropolitan 
countries (notably ‘Reaganomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’), but also by the notion of 
‘market socialism’ in the former (and, in the case of China, still) state socialist 
countries”.  
 
This pro-market shift, largely driven by the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, impacted on the global arena of agrarian and land reform and militated against 
the more redistributive and interventionist land reform policies that had been 
prevalent in many countries during the 1960s and 1970s (IUF, 2001; Ghimire, 2001; 
Lahiff et al 2007). 
 
Based primarily on the findings of theorists such as Deininger and Binswanger 
(1999) regarding the efficacy of land reform programmes since the 1960s and their 
rejection of state-led and compulsory models of land reform programmes, the World 
Bank advocated a new model of agrarian reform, known variously as ‘negotiated’, 
‘market-assisted’ or ‘market-based’ land reform, where the principle of the willing 
seller/willing buyer transaction governs the form, pace and scope of land reform, and 
where the market is the central mechanism for land redistribution (Aliber and 
Mokoena, 2002; Ghimire, 2001; Greenberg, 2003; Department of Land Affairs, 1997; 
World Bank, 2003). According to this model, land redistribution is to occur via 
privatised, decentralised land transactions between ‘willing sellers’ and ‘willing 
buyers’ (Deininger & H Binswanger, 1999; Borras, 2003). The World Bank advocates 
the land market as the most effective mechanism for providing the landless with land 
and for developing equity and efficiency (World Bank, 1993; 1997; 2003).  
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The World Bank has strongly advocated this approach in a number of countries – 
most notably, Brazil, the Philippines, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and South 
Africa - in a bid to align land reform policies with the economic policies favoured by 
the International Monetary Fund (El-Ghomeny, 2001:106; Ghimire, 2001:23) and in 
accordance with the principles underpinning what has become known as The 
Washington Consensus.i  
 
In South Africa, with the advent of liberalisation in the late 1980s, prior to the African 
National Congress (ANC) gaining power, the ground was laid for a more ‘free-
market’ oriented and deregulated economy (Marais, 1998).  The new government 
had a range of political, legal and administrative options for the design of a land 
reform programme at its disposal but these were tempered by the framework that 
was established during the negotiations of the early 1990s and by the international 
pressures brought to bear on the various negotiating partners (Walker, 2003).  
 
The World Bank showed interest in shaping the character and scope of the land 
reform programme to be implemented in post-apartheid South Africa and came to 
play an instrumental role in setting the parameters for the development and 
formulation of South Africa’s land reform policy. In 1993, World Bank officials held 
discussions with key South African leaders regarding a ‘market-assisted’ approach to 
land reform (World Bank, 1993).  
 
The interest shown by the ANC in the market-based model contradicted its earlier 
policy commitments such as those outlined in the Ready to Govern statement of 
1992 which had advocated nationalisation and expropriation and other non-market 
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mechanisms for land redistribution, and the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) of 1994 which emphasised a central role for the state in the 
redistribution of land, and which had specifically noted that, “Only a tiny minority of 
black people can afford land on the free market” (1994:20). 
 
In the period from 1994 to 1996 when White Papers on land and agricultural policy 
and their respective implementation frameworks were being developed, the post of 
the Minister without Portfolio - responsible for overseeing the RDP - was abolished. 
This was followed in March 1996 by the closure of the RDP office. According to 
Wildschut and Hulbert (1998:11), this was widely interpreted as “a retreat from a 
transformative agenda to a new emphasis on private sector, investment-driven 
strategies.” 
 
In contrast to the ANC’s earlier policy statements and interest shown in other state-
led redistributive programmes, and in accordance with its shift towards an increasing 
adherence to a neo-liberal orientation, thereby reducing the role of the state in the 
provision of social welfare and services, the ANC adopted a framework that placed 
emphasis on the land market as the mechanism through which land ownership 
would become aligned with the demographics of the country (Deininger & May, 
2000; African National Congress, 1994; Williams, 1996). In the course of defining its 
role vis-a-vis the redistribution of land and adopting a market-based approach, the 
new government opted for elements of an indirect and decentralised approach, 
reminiscent of Adam Smith’s much vaunted ‘hidden hand’ as described in The 
Wealth of Nations of 1776. 
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However, given the highly unequal nature of South African society (May, 1998), the 
need to address and placate competing interests (Walker, 2001) and the fact that the 
negotiated settlement had left the bulk of the power and wealth of the white minority 
intactii (Lahiff, 2007(b):2; Williams, 1996:152), policy designers were compelled to 
acknowledge existing inequalities and the contested nature of the socio-political 
terrain and recognise that the market alone could not redress these. The South 
African land reform programme that resulted from the constitutional negotiations 
process was therefore required to creatively combine a commitment to the principle 
of social justice and the needs and expectations of the landless and dispossessed, 
within the parameters of market-based land reform and the protection of private 
property (Walker, 2001:4). Existing landowners were able to secure the inclusion of 
the protection of property rights within the Constitution, while the landless had their 
interests accommodated in the promise of a speedy redistribution of land, restitution 
and improvements in land tenure (Walker, 2001) accompanied by various support 
provisions. 
 
The outcome of the land reform policy-making process was a hybrid of state- and 
market-based policy (de Bremond, in Lahiff et al, 2007) which does not rely solely on 
the market but incorporates a degree of state intervention in the form of a set of land 
reform programmes which include scope for a changeable suite of associated 
strategies and support facilities. The state has relied on redistribution modalities 
based on the operation of the existing land market accompanied by limited grants 
and support services to assist willing and prospective land reform buyers to engage 
in the land market (Lahiff, 2007b). In addition, other options such as expropriation 
are available to the state but have largely remaining untested. The state has 
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continued to play a role in establishing and maintaining the necessary infrastructure 
to support the land market - such as a systematised deeds registry, financial 
services and systems, professional land surveyors and valuators.  
 
The Constitution’s mandate and the intention of the 1997 White Paper on South 
African Land Policy was to address the dispossession of land through three broad 
categories of reform - land restitution, which provides relief for victims of forced 
removals; tenure reform, which is intended to secure and extend the tenure rights of 
those previously discriminated against; and land redistribution, which is a 
discretionary programme to redress the racial imbalance of landholding (Lahiff, 
2007b). The formulation and implementation of each of these policy areas, however,  
increasingly came to reflect an adherence to the principles of South Africa's neo-
liberal macro-economic policy - the Growth and Employment and Redistribution 
strategy (GEAR) - and the adoption of a market-driven and investor-friendly 
approach (Greenberg, 2003).   
 
Aligned to the macro-economic policy, a key piece of legislation governing the 
redistribution of land was introduced - the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement 
Act 126 of 1993, amended in 1998 and re-titled the Provision of Land and Assistance 
Act. This Act did not however provide programmatic detail about the nature and 
mechanisms to facilitate land redistribution but essentially served as an instrument to 
enable the Minister of Land Affairs to allocate financial assistance for the purchase of 
land, with the details of land redistribution being deferred and located in various 
policy documents such as the White Paper on South African Land Policy (Lahiff, 
2007b).   
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This White Paper reflects the guiding principles for the State's intervention in the land 
market through the land redistribution programme:  
“The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with 
access to land for residential and productive uses, in order to improve their 
income and quality of life. The programme aims to assist the poor, labour 
tenants, farm workers, women, as well as emergent farmers. Redistributive 
land reform will be largely based on willing-buyer willing-seller arrangements. 
Government will assist in the purchase of land but will in general not be the 
buyer or owner. Rather it will make land acquisition grants available and will 
support and finance the required planning process. In many cases, 
communities are expected to pool their resources to negotiate, buy and jointly 
hold land under a formal title deed. Opportunities are also offered for 
individuals to access the grant for land acquisition” (Department of Land 
Affairs, 1997b:38).  
 
The White Paper (1997b: 38) then details the land redistribution strategy which 
outlines a programme for land acquisition, land transfer, assistance with basic needs 
provision and land development. The following tasks and commitments are outlined, 
all of which, if implemented, should theoretically result in increased levels of land 
acquisition by the poor and landless via the land market: 
● removal of impediments to the efficient operation of the land market 
● identification and allocation of state land for redistribution 
● establish financial mechanisms to provide grants and loans for land 
acquisition and development 
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● provision of assistance to groups to establish legal entities to purchase and 
lease land 
● provision of dispute resolution services to seek local solutions 
● assistance to enable beneficiaries to meet basic needs and utilise land in a 
sustainable manner. 
 
The State has addressed the above commitments to varying degrees by means of 
different redistribution initiatives, with an emphasis on the provision of grants and 
loans for land acquisition. The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) currently has two 
main mechanisms through which land redistribution takes place – the Land 
Redistribution and Agricultural Development (LRAD) Programme and the Municipal 
Commonage Programme. These two programmes entail the use of different 
mechanisms and procedures for resource-poor land seekers to acquire or lease land 
through the land market.  
 
Until 2000, the redistribution programme provided the Settlement/Land Acquisition 
Grant (SLAG) – an amount of R16 000 allocated to eligible households who had an 
income under R1 500 per month. In 2001, the SLAG grant was effectively 
superseded by the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
programme, which shifted the target from ‘the poorest of the poor’ to the pursuit of 
commercially-oriented agriculture (Hall et al, 2003). Unlike SLAG, the LRAD grants 
were paid to individuals and not per household and the amounts available to 
prospective beneficiaries were larger and based on a sliding scale, dependent on the 
individual’s own contribution in cash or kind, with the minimum contribution being R5 
000 in order to obtain a R20 000 grant. The maximum grant available to an individual 
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is R100 000. Applications for additional loan financing through institutions such as 
the state-owned Land Bank was provided for. LRAD also removed the income 
ceiling, thereby enabling new black middle-class and private sector entrants into the 
land market through the land reform programme (Walker, 2003).  
 
The National Policy Framework of the DLA as outlined in 2000 states that the LRAD 
programme is a beneficiary and demand-driven process. This approach places the 
responsibility for identifying available land and associated willing sellers with willing 
buyers, and in this instance, with resource-poor land-seekers.  
 
As a result of the small size of the available grants relative to the size and cost of 
available land, coupled with a reticence amongst sellers and officials to consider 
sub-division, the majority of redistribution projects have involved groups of applicants 
pooling their grants to purchase land. In addition, groups of farm workers have used 
the grant to purchase shares in existing farming enterprises, especially in areas of 
high-value agricultural land such as the Western Cape (Lahiff, 2007b).  
 
The Department of Land Affairs’ Local Government Commonage Programme is 
outlined in the White Paper on South African Land Policy: “In large parts of the 
country, in small rural towns and settlements, poor people need to gain access to 
grazing land and small arable/garden areas in order to supplement their income and 
to enhance household food security. The Department of Land Affairs will encourage 
local authorities to develop the conditions that will enable poor residents to access 
existing commonage, currently used for other purposes. Further, the Department will 
provide funds to enable resource-poor municipalities to acquire additional land for 
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this purpose” (Department of Land Affairs, White Paper on South African Land 
Policy, 1997b:50 – 51). 
 
The Commonage programme allows the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs to 
grant an advance or subsidy - the Grant for the Acquisition of Land for Municipal 
Commonage - to Municipal Councils to acquire land through the land market for use 
as commonage and to be leased by landless people earning less than R1 500 per 
month. The current level of the grant for the acquisition of municipal commonage 
land is set at the value or selling price of the land in question, while the infrastructure 
development grant is set at a maximum of 25% of the value of the land (DLA, 
1997a). No planning grant is provided, on the presumption that land-use planning at 
the municipal level is part of the local Integrated Development Planning process as 
stipulated in the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003). 
 
Notwithstanding the existence of these land reform programmes and the State’s 
interventions in the land market and the provision of support grants and services, a 
number of non-governmental land sector agencies that assist resource-poor land-
seekers to acquire land have persistently argued that insufficient land is available for 
land reform and that resource-poor rural land-seekers’ attempts to acquire land 
through the land market are frustrated (AFRA, 2006; CRLS, 2003; Mngxitama, 2006; 
SPP, 2003). This study was prompted by a request from the Surplus People Project 
(SPP) to explore this claim and to interrogate whether resource-poor, rural, land 
seekers are able to acquire land through the market-based land reform programme 
and in doing so, consider whether the land market is an appropriate mechanism for 
addressing redistribution and land need.  
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In order to ascertain whether there was any concrete evidence to substantiate these 
claims, appropriate research sites were identified. The Magisterial Districts of 
Namaqualand and Hantam in the District of Namaqualand in the Northern Cape 
Province, and the Magisterial Districts of Bergrivier, Cedarberg and Matzikama in the 
West Coast District of the Western Cape were selected (details of which are outlined 
in Chapter Three). These sites are included in the operational areas of the SPP and 
the organisation facilitated access to communities and land reform projects in these 
areas, thereby providing an entry point for the research. 
 
These sites enabled the researcher to access data across two provinces and obtain 
potentially differing insights into the geographic and socio-political dynamics that 
may impact on the way in which local land markets function in different contexts. The 
experiences of rural people’s attempts to acquire land in the arid regions of 
Namaqualand and the Hantam and in the better-resourced West Coast of the 
Western Cape potentially provided the scope for a range of experiences in differing 
contexts.   
 
In interrogating the claim made by NGOs as outlined above, the following key 
research questions were considered: 
• What are the operational dynamics of the land market? 
• How do these dynamics enable or hinder the acquisition of land by 
prospective land reform beneficiaries? 
• What has been the experience of those trying to acquire land through 
market-based land reform? 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
In framing and addressing these questions, the study draws on an agrarian political 
economy perspective - as used by theorists such as Akram-Lodhi (2007) and 
Courville (2005), amongst others. This approach provides scope for a consideration 
of the various contexts and dynamics involved in land transactions and the extent to 
which these are determined by their socially embedded determinants and the politics 
of policy-making. In line with this perspective, the study focuses on the social 
determinants of landholding and of land markets and explores two key aspects in 
relation to the claims made by land sector agencies.  Firstly, it provides a critique of 
the underlying assumptions prevalent in much of the current market-based land 
reform policy as advocated by its national and international proponents and the 
manner in which the market as a mechanism for land redistribution has been 
conceptualized and its outcomes envisaged. Secondly, it considers the extent to 
which this conceptualization - which it is argued, draws on idealized notions of land 
market functioning and efficacy - is realized and examines the extent to which the 
envisaged outcomes of market-based land reform are aligned with or contradicted by 
the functioning of real markets and the experiences of resource-poor land seeking 
people in their attempts to engage in the land market, with limited state support. The 
details of the market’s operation are analysed, with a distinction made between the 
operational practice of real markets – based on direct evidence-based observation – 
and degrees of policy abstraction and theoretical assumptions regarding how 
markets should or might operate. 
 
The following chapter (below) provides a theoretical framework and overview of the 
international and local debates about land markets in both their idealised and real 
forms.  Contributing to this theoretical framework is a synthesis of the key features 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
and policy assumptions regarding the functioning and characterisation of land 
markets in South Africa and the elements necessary for land market transactions. 
The chapter provides the analytical framework for the empirical aspect of the study. 
Findings arising from the case studies (detailed in chapters three and four) regarding 
the operation of real land markets are matched against this framework. The key 
elements of this synthesis include a focus on the following features and 
assumptions:  
● A commodity – in this instance, land – must be available for transaction and 
must be taken up by an adequate response and level of activity.  
● Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange exist within the 
sphere of the market. It is assumed by proponents of the land market that the 
buyers, sellers and their intermediaries who interact in the market do so as 
equal partners and are viewed as reliable and trustworthy.  For them to 
engage as equal partners, it is assumed that the market is accessible and 
open to all who wish to engage in it and that all have equal access to 
information. 
● Land market activity presupposes adequate levels of purchasing power and 
available capital. It is assumed that willing buyers have the necessary 
expertise and wherewithal to purchase land in the market and have access to 
the necessary personal finance and/or land reform grants. 
 
Chapter Three describes the research methodology, the selection of the research 
sites and case studies, and the data gathering process and analysis. Key features 
and trends in the land market are considered, based on data gathered from the 
Northern and Western Cape. An analysis of all the agricultural land transactions that 
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occurred during the five-year period from 1998 to 2002 across five registration 
divisionsiii within the two districts of Namaqualand in the Northern Cape and the 
West Coast in the Western Cape was undertaken. To this end, copies of all the 
relevant title deeds were obtained from the Cape Town Deeds Office and relevant 
data was extracted and entered into a spreadsheet. The number and size of land 
reform transactions for the same five registration divisions were then identified as a 
data sub-set and compared with the number and land size of all the agricultural land 
transactions which took place in the period and geographic areas under review. The 
number of land reform transactions as a proportion of general land market activity is 
presented. In addition, three specific land-seeking communities across the five 
selected registration divisions were identified as case studies and their experiences 
of attempting to acquire land through the market-based programme were 
investigated and documented.  
 
Chapter four provides an overview of the three community case studies and provides 
background information on their various locations and the attempts made to acquire 
land through the market-based land reform programme. The Brandvlei Emerging 
Farmers' Association in the Calvinia registration division of the Hantam Karoo region 
in the Northern Cape consists of small-scale farmers from the Brandvlei community. 
This case highlights the challenges confronting small-scale farmers in their attempts 
to access commonage through the Municipal Commonage Programme. The study of 
the Hondeklipbaai community in the Namaqualand registration division of the 
Northern Cape illustrates the impact of land availability on the operations of the land 
market and those attempting to engage in it. The study of the Bergrivier Emerging 
Farmers' Forum of Eendekuil, under the Piketberg registration division in the 
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Western Cape, illustrates the attempt of small-scale farmers to utilise LRAD grants 
and external financial assistance to acquire land for commercial agricultural 
activities.  
 
Chapter five considers the findings of the study and highlights pertinent outcomes 
from the case studies and the analysis of the title deeds of all the agricultural land 
transactions under review. These transactions are analysed in relation to the extent 
of land reform acquisitions in the same geographic areas. The functioning and 
accessibility of local land markets are considered in relation to the policy 
assumptions regarding the key ingredients necessary for market transactions. The 
findings provide an insight into the workings and efficacy of real land markets within 
the case study locations and are compared with the espoused principles and 
outcomes envisaged by market-based land policy with its reliance on the land market 
as the primary mechanism for land redistribution. 
 
Chapter six concludes with a commentary on the key findings of the study and the 
extent to which real land needs can be met through the South African version of 
market-based land reform, predicated on a set of policy assumptions about the role 
and efficacy of the land market. The findings of this study point to a glaring gap 
between the State’s espoused policy and actual practice, between what the market 
(as characterised within a range of idealised and real configurations) is expected to 
deliver and the extent to which land acquisition by resource-poor land seekers has 
been enabled by the State’s response and provision of support. In essence, this gap 
reflects a lack of integration between the spheres of what Bernstein (1994:3) refers 
to as ‘market logic’ and ‘bureaucratic action’. Many of the origins of this schism can 
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be traced to the politics of the process surrounding the State’s adoption of market-
based land reform in the early 1990s; the manner in which the land market has been 
characterised in South African land reform policy and the implications of this for 
policy formulation and implementation; and the nature and level of support provided 
to land reform beneficiaries by the state.  
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Chapter Two – Theoretical framework and key policy assumptions  
 
The land market can simplistically be described as an institution, arena or 
mechanism through which landowners sell to those with the means to buy. Wallace 
et al (2004:4) suggest that people usually assume that the land market is “the realm 
of human activity involved in buying, selling, leasing and securing land”.  However, in 
order to better understand the workings of the land market and the extent of market 
activity and access, the key features and policy assumptions that constitute and 
hinder or enable land market activity must be deconstructed.  This chapter provides 
a theoretical framework and overview of the international and local debates about 
land markets in their idealised and real forms and in doing so, deconstructs the key 
features and policy assumptions regarding the nature and functioning of land 
markets in the South African context. The resulting synthesis provides the analytical 
framework for the empirical aspect of this study. 
 
White (1993:2) argues that an effort to ‘deconstruct’ the market is becoming more 
urgent in the current and changing global politico-economic context in which the old 
dichotomy between ‘centrally planned’ and ‘market economies’ has been replaced by 
a situation in which it is becoming increasingly clear that there is a wide variety of 
market economies. He suggests that the neo-classicallyiv derived paradigm of ‘the 
market’ has become inadequate for the purposes of elucidating the dynamics of real 
markets as the range of market diversity changes. 
 
The deconstruction of specific national and local land markets in order to discern 
their theoretical and operating paradigm requires searching beyond that which is 
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documented and framed in policy documents. Following Wallace et al (2004:19), 
land markets generate their own myths and shared understandings and a search for 
a coherent policy characterization of land markets “will reveal high levels of unwritten 
consensus about markets, access to land and social equity”. They further suggest 
that although a country may have officially stated policies for dealing with land, policy 
is formed by an “amorphous process of socio-political construction of a set of shared 
values about the importance of ownership and accessibility” (2004:22).  The absence 
of specificity in policy documents suggests that there is a set of axiomatic 
assumptions underpinning land redistribution policy and implies that the land market 
mechanism for redistributing land is viewed as self-evident and unproblematic.  
 
White (1993:2) suggests that, “the abstract conception of the market deriving from 
neo-classical economics overrides variations in real markets which are very 
important for considering and tackling practical problems of development”.  This is 
echoed by Mackintosh (1990) who suggests that the avoidance of characterisation 
and the tendency to not acknowledge the complexity of markets has resulted in 
negative consequences for both the beneficiaries and land reform implementers. 
Idealised and abstracted notions of the market have found little applicability or 
resonance with those attempting to engage with real markets and those trying to 
address land need. 
 
The absence of any specific analysis or coherent characterisation of the land market 
in South African land reform policy documents or legal frameworks, has by default 
resulted in a range of ‘myths’, perceptions and assumptions on the part of land 
sector policy-makers, officials, implementers and beneficiaries – these range from 
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those which reflect the market in terms of abstracted and idealised neo-classical 
principles to those that are more aligned to the workings of real markets. Besides 
outlining the provision of support services and land reform grants and their use by 
land reform beneficiaries in order to acquire or access land through the market-
based land reform programme (DLA, 1997a, 1997b, 1999), South African policy 
documents do not explicitly analyse how the land reform programme will interact with 
the land market or provide a detailed characterization of the nature and role of the 
market as understood in the context of South African land redistribution.  
 
The lack of characterisation of the land market in the South African context has 
fostered an ‘unwritten consensus’ and has led in some instances to individual policy 
makers and implementers arbitrarily interpreting the nature and scope of the land 
market in accordance with their own world view.  One of the outcomes of this lack of 
characterisation is a set of assumptions that draws on elements from the neo-
classical school of economics which portrays markets as inert intermediaries 
between mutually benefiting transacting parties and as inherently accessible and 
benign (Cartwright and Qeqe, 2004). These policy assumptions imply a notion of an 
idealised market and one that is not impacted upon or shaped by contending interest 
groups but that simply exists a priori.  
 
Wallace et al (2004:7) suggest that each country develops its own patterns and 
activities associated with the development of its land market, but that as a result of 
globalisation, local systems begin to adopt generic and common features. The 
elements necessary for land market activity and the range of policy assumptions that 
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accompany them have evolved as the land market has emerged in various contexts 
– these are synthesised below. 
 
Land as a commodity available for transaction 
Wallace et al (2004) state that “the physical parcel of land as a unique commodity is 
the starting point” in understanding the land market. A key assumption underpinning 
the workings of the land market is the manner in which land itself is viewed – 
primarily as a commodity to be bought and sold. 
 
The evolution of the land market under modern capitalism and the consequent 
speculative value placed on land has transformed it into a commodity. Gutto (1993) 
argues that within countries of Southern Africa, with Roman-Dutch legal systems 
mediated by English common law and elements of indigenous African legal 
traditions, it is customary to view land and land rights under the “law of things”. 
Following Marx (1986:72) and Lukàcs (1923:1), land became viewed as private 
property – as a 'thing' to be protected, bought and sold.  As a result of land being 
reduced to a ‘thing’, the potential exists for land to be stripped of the multiple values 
it holds for different groups so that it comes to be regarded primarily in terms of its 
value in relation to the market.  Viewing land as a commodity can potentially 
preclude recognition of the varied values and meanings that are ascribed to and 
associated with land, such as multiple livelihoods, a range of different land use 
patterns, socio-political memories, and an acknowledgement of the different kinds of 
relationships people have to each other and to the land in terms of history, identity, 
community, gender, age, and religious and cultural beliefs.  Walker (2001: 9-10) 
suggests that,  
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‘For poor people, a secure place to live, carries enormous value in their daily 
struggle to cobble together a living from a variety of income sources which 
include, but go beyond, the material resources offered by the land itself. In 
addition, land carries with it a highly charged, historically indexed symbolic 
significance at the political level… Land reform is about returning that which 
was stolen, that which was used to dispossess, that which fuelled the struggle 
against apartheid by the black majority. At the individual and community level 
land is imbued with cultural and emotional meaning that is based on more 
than its purely utilitarian value. Land is still a potent factor in the social identity 
of many South Africans, especially but not exclusively in the rural areas. As a 
consequence, the popular debate on land reform policy continues to be 
infused with an emotional content that derives its power both from the brutal 
memory of land dispossession and from the shimmering promise of redress 
held out by liberation ... land is imbued with cultural and emotional meaning 
that is based on more than its purely utilitarian value.’  
 
Borrowing from Wallace et al (2004), while acknowledging that land is primarily 
defined as a physical commodity or ‘thing’ within the context of market economies, it 
is also concurrently understood as being imbued with a range of associated values 
and meanings. Furthermore, while the commodity of land is a concrete physical 
entity, the use, ownership and control of land and the social relations associated with 
it are essentially abstract concepts of rights and powers.  
 
The commodity of land, albeit valued in a myriad of ways, is central to the functioning 
of the land market which is premised firstly, on the presence of the commodity of 
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land and secondly, on this commodity being made available for transaction. Where 
there is no available land for transaction, the market becomes static and in effect 
non-existent. An active land market where the supply of agricultural land is elastic is 
a necessary condition for market success and therefore for a successful market-
assisted land reform programme to operate (World Bank, 2003). Gordillo and 
Boening (1999) caution that a market-based approach to land reform can only work 
effectively in regions where there is a sufficient or excess supply of land in order to 
avoid triggering an increase in land prices. Deininger (1999, 27(4):651 - 672) 
suggests that the ideal ratio of land supply to demand is 3:1.   
 
Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange  
For the commodity of land to be transacted on the market, transactors – and in the 
case of market-based land reform, ‘willing sellers’ and ‘willing buyers’ – are 
necessary. There are a number of assumptions regarding the nature of these 
interactions and relations of negotiation and exchange. 
 
According to Marx (1986), with the advent of capitalist economies and the 
consequent treatment of land as a transactable commodity or thing, the social 
relations between classes of people also came to be treated as relations between 
things: “There is a definite social relation between men that assumes ... the fantastic 
form of a relation between things” (1986:72). This concept is further developed by 
Lukàcs (1923:1), “... a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and 
thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and 
all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation 
between people.”  
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Neo-classical economics and those who subscribe to abstract and idealised theories 
of markets do not explicitly recognise the impact of social relations, class differences, 
or positions in society – such  as the relations between landowners and the landless, 
men and women, rich and poor, young and old – on land market transactions. 
Abstract theories of markets posit that land is a neutral object, a thing, to be bought 
and sold and that these transactions take place between equal players – equal 
'things’ – interacting in the market. According to Cartwright et al (2004), the nature of 
the exchange is premised on a notion that the transactors are neutral intermediaries, 
that the exchange takes place between mutually benefiting transactors and that the 
market is accessible, with equal opportunities allocated to all groupings in society.  
 
Bernstein et al (1990: 4) suggest that the land market should not be conceptualised 
as the “manifestation of impersonal laws of demand and supply or of a ‘hidden 
hand’”, but that markets are “social institutions and processes that people enter from 
very different positions in structures of class, gender and power,” and these in turn 
affect the outcome of their endeavours. This is affirmed by El-Ghomeny (2001), who 
argues that the land market has specific socio-political features that require particular 
attention and a different mode of analysis, rather than simply being viewed as an 
isolated economic mechanism serving to equilibrate supply and demand. The land 
market cannot therefore be viewed as an abstraction or a neutral, apolitical 
mechanism for the transferring of land between sellers and buyers but is an 
inherently complex and dynamic site of struggle between unequal partners, and may 
serve particular vested interests while excluding those of others (Sen, 2001). 
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Akram-Lodhi (2007:1437) argues that market-based land reform “is premised on 
assumptions that fail to recognise the socially embedded character of land transfers”. 
He further suggests that “land is a cultural resource, being a principal way in which 
the social and cultural identities that shape power and powerlessness within the 
myriad diversity of rural societies are formed”.  
 
The consideration of social power and powerlessness is also addressed by White 
(1993:2) who argues that the conventional economic analysis of markets downplays 
the role of power, which he views as a key element of real markets. He advocates 
that a political analysis of markets is needed in order to reflect the ways in which 
power and power relations influence the structure and operation of real markets. He 
differentiates between two fundamental views of power – a behavioural and a 
structural view. The first concentrates on power in terms of interactions between two 
agents – in this instance, the seller and buyer – and tends to ignore the basis and 
derivation of each agent’s “initial endowments of power resources” (1993:3) and how 
power is exercised. The behavioural view tends to perceive transactors in the market 
as equal players with equal access. Beyond this behavioural view of power, White 
proposes that, “each real market is a patterned set of social relations with its own 
specific constellation of power; if the power relation involved in a micro-level market 
exchange is to be understood it must be situated in the context of a structural 
analysis of this wider system. The power-patterning of markets affects an agent’s 
choice by determining the boundaries of available choices, influencing the 
operational calculus of the chooser and shaping the relative attractiveness of various 
choices. A combination of behavioural and structural analysis also allows us to 
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capture the dynamics of the operation of power within markets as a systemic 
process” (White, 1993:3). 
 
White identifies four different types of power that are at play in the complex process 
of market politics and the interaction between transactors:  
• the politics of state involvement involving state power - this includes the 
state’s role in the regulation and taxation of land, and participation in land 
markets and land reform; 
• the politics of market organisation involving internal associational power 
where the systems of internal regulation are created by market participants; 
• the politics of market structure involving economic power;  
• the politics of social ‘embeddedness’ involving various forms of 
social/cultural/ideological power, where power is inherent in social and cultural 
institutions, ideologies, gender relations and value systems.  
 
Each of these forms of power is never absent and is interwoven into the broader set 
of social relations that intersect to grant men and women a place within the structure 
and hierarchy of their society, and impacts on their ability to access or acquire land.  
The development of the land market and the way in which it functions is determined 
by these relationships of power and a struggle between the various forces that they 
represent – “the characteristic economic features of markets embody political 
processes of conflict and cooperation and political relations of domination and 
subordination” (White, 1993:3). 
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White (1993:2) states that an idealised notion of the market “abstracts from social, 
political and institutional aspects of real markets which cannot be dismissed as 
‘exogenous’ factors but are inherent, and indeed may be essential, characteristics of 
the functioning of markets in the real world”.  
 
According to White (1993:8), the land market can thus be understood in terms of “a 
structure of power relations between agents with differential control over market-
relevant material and mental assets. At the micro level, participants come to specific 
markets with unequal endowments in terms of resources. At the macro level, this 
results in widely different market structures characterised by more or less equal or 
unequal power; each specific structure of power conditions the way markets operate 
at the macro-level, shapes the character of exchange relations between individual 
market participants and influences their relative returns from exchange”.  
 
Bhaduri (1986: 267-72) develops this idea and refers to the ‘class efficiency’ of 
markets and views the market mechanism as an instrument to further exploit one 
class by another, rather than perceiving it as an efficient system through which to 
allocate and redistribute wealth and resources.  
 
White contends that markets can be analysed as “political games in which outcomes 
are structured in terms of choices taken in the context of variable but structured 
asymmetries in the capacities of participants, which vary across specific markets and 
which may in certain contexts result in systematic exploitation through unequal 
exchange ...” (1993:8). 
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The World Bank and keen advocates of the market such as Binswanger and 
Deininger (1996: 70) acknowledge that it is necessary to consider the social context 
of land markets: “The land market cannot be expected to lead to an efficiency-
enhancing redistribution of land because poor family farmers who do not have much 
equity cannot acquire land”. Deininger et al (1998:2) also state that, “It is well 
understood that this idealised process has rarely been followed in actual history” and 
that “... in a number of countries, a highly unequal land ownership distribution implies 
inefficient and inequitable resource use which the land sales or rental market are not 
able to smoothly transform into a more efficient and equitable allocation”. They 
further indicate that “unmitigated operation of land markets alone would not 
necessarily produce an optimal land allocation” and that “in situations characterised 
by pervasive inequality in the ownership distribution of land or assets more generally, 
government involvement in redistributive land reform, aiming to improve efficiency 
and equity and at the same time remove impediments to the functioning of factor 
markets, could be justified” (1998:31-32). 
 
Bernstein (1994:1) describes the World Bank, and its policy prescription of market-
based land reform,  as aspiring to “wrap up the savage contradictions of South Africa 
in a policy package of ‘efficiency and equity’ ... The market is likewise to be the basis 
for land reform through assisted purchase of land by carefully selected 
‘beneficiaries’.  This amounts to a policy of ‘betting on the strong’: such beneficiaries 
are most likely to be men already active in agricultural commodity production and/or 
with other assets and sources of capital. Their identification and selection, moreover, 
are held to require elaborate administrative procedures.”  Bernstein (1994:3) 
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suggests that South African land reform policy is an attempt to address ‘market logic’ 
and its failings by means of ‘bureaucratic action’ in the form of ‘assisted purchase’. 
 
In acknowledging that markets (in the neo-classical sense) do fail, Stiglitz (2002: 73-
74) asserts that a degree of state intervention is therefore necessary to assist those 
with limited access: “… whenever information is imperfect and markets incomplete, 
which is to say always, and especially in developing countries, … there are desirable 
government interventions which, in principle, can improve upon the efficiency of the 
market … Many of the key activities of government can be understood as responses 
to the resulting market failure.”  
 
In order to meet its Constitutional and policy obligations and in accordance with the 
acknowledged potential for market failure and the inability of the land market to result 
in equitable land redistribution, Cartwright and Qeqe (2004) argue that the South 
African state is compelled to intervene in the market, as rampant free-market activity 
will not, of its own accord, take cognisance of the needs of the poor and that “without 
interventions, the outcome of contested exchanges (in the market) perpetuates 
existing patterns of poverty and power” (Cartwright and Qeqe, 2004:8). The South 
African state therefore intervenes in the land market through its various market-
based land reform programmes and provision of limited support services and land 
reform grants to beneficiaries of these programmes. It maintains that this support will 
act as a corrective and enable prospective beneficiaries to overcome obstacles in 
their attempts to interact with the market (DLA, 1997b). The inclusion of grant 
provision in the land reform ‘package’ can be viewed as an acknowledgement on the 
part of policy formulators that while in a strictly theoretical and idealised sense, 
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South Africa’s land market is accessible to all, the reality is that the “rules of the 
game” (North, 1989: 5) that govern the market – the social relations and networks, 
flows of information, skills levels, access to finance, power blocs – pose significant 
obstacles for entry by resource-poor land-seeking people.  
 
Transactions based on reliability and trust 
In commenting on the nature of relationships of exchange, Wallace et al (2004:22) 
propose that dependence on transaction reliability and being able to verify or vouch 
for the reliability of a prospective buyer, their membership of certain groups, and the 
minimisation of risk in incorporating outsiders into groups involved in transactions are 
regarded as a feature of certain land markets. 
 
Ostrom (1992, 17(9):1320) suggests that the existence of a relationship of 
engagement  and a level of ‘trust’ lubricates and facilitates land transactions between 
sellers and buyers: “... transactions are facilitated and made easier and more likely 
when some form of relationship exists between transacting parties. This relationship 
may constitute an acquaintance, a previous encounter, a cultural link or a political 
reference. Over time these relationships become embedded in the fabric of markets 
and serve the interests of market incumbents. Those not party to the network of 
relationships, or market culture, may struggle to access markets…” Class, race and 
gender constructs and the social relations embedded in rural areas which are 
frequently based on perceptions of what constitutes ‘reliability’ and 'trustworthiness' 
impact directly on land reform transactions and on the degree of access to land 
markets.  
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 Given that resource-poor prospective new entrants to the land market are not 
generally connected into the broader rural social network of existing market 
participants, and therefore do not have the benefit of such a verification process to 
vouch for their reliability, they are confronted by the challenge of finding an entry 
point into the market. 
 
Access to information  
An additional and linked factor which militates against resource-poor prospective 
entrants gaining access to the land market is their limited access to information. A 
common policy assumption is that information regarding available land, land prices, 
and other factors about the land market are uniformly and equally at the disposal of 
all players who wish to engage in the land market. Reality reflects that the patterns of 
information dissemination and access are uneven and truncated and, according to 
Cartwright and Qeqe (2004:5), tends to reflect patterns of wealth, with poorer 
farmers finding themselves with less market information and at a disadvantage. 
 
Stiglitz (1996:62) suggests that “information imperfection” is a major contributing 
factor in limiting the extent to which markets can be decentralised or made 
accessible. He adds that  information asymmetry has particular implications for 
certain contexts – in countries or markets where class and gender ‘gaps’ are more 
pronounced, there is likely to be a heightened degree of information asymmetry and 
that this should be corrected or considered by the workings of the market or through 
intervention by the state or other institutions. This is reiterated by Deininger and 
Feder (1998: 10) who suggest that “facilitating transactions between individuals who 
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are not members of the same community ... generally involve larger problems of 
asymmetric information”.  
 
Adequate levels of purchasing power and available capital  
Internationally, there is a very limited number of land transactions involving small 
scale farmers. Where these do occur, they are invariably mediated by support from 
land reform programmes.  Deininger and Feder (1998) propose that it is very difficult 
for small scale farmers or resource-poor land seekers to access markets for credit 
and insurance. This is compounded by the fact that it is “very difficult to acquire land 
in the sales market with the expectation of paying off the debt from agricultural profits 
alone without recourse to equity … both limited availability of credit and high cost of 
borrowing would prevent those who do not have accumulated savings from acquiring 
land” (Deininger and Feder, 1998:18).  
 
The barrier of access to formal credit or grants is a fundamental cause of the 
perpetuation of market segmentation and exclusion. Besides obvious class 
differences, El-Ghomeny (2001) points to some of the reasons for the unequal 
buying power of most rural workers who wish to acquire land and who are unable to 
access support via a land reform programme or other external support. He questions 
whether a wage-dependent landless worker can independently purchase land in his 
or her lifetime and asks how long a worker would need to save all or part of his or 
her daily wage (assuming that he/she is not unemployed) in order to purchase land 
in the open market. He points to empirical evidence which indicates that 
opportunities for rural workers to buy land through the market are virtually non-
existent, owing to (a) the downward trend in cropland availability per working person 
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in agriculture; (b) inflated land-sale prices combined with falling daily wages in real 
terms and increases in the cost of living; (c) the increasing demand for land – not 
only as a commodity but as a unique social asset; and (d) the impossibility of 
obtaining land mortgages and the high risk of lending capital to landless workers and 
asset-poor peasants. All these factors contribute to a very limited ability to acquire 
land and point to the imperative that the state intervene in the land market, through 
the introduction of land reform programmes and associated grants and loans, in a 
bid to ameliorate the level of exclusion of the resource-poor.  
 
It is for this reason, amongst others, that the South African state introduced land 
reform policy intended to enable land acquisition and access. The White Paper on 
South African Land Policy states that, “The reality is that the poor and the landless 
are not in a position to acquire land at market prices without assistance from the 
state. This is because the market price of land usually includes a premium, over and 
above the capitalised value of agricultural profits. Poor farmers will therefore not be 
able to repay loans out of farm profits and will need financial assistance from the 
state in addition to, or instead of, credit” (DLA, 1997b:17). 
 
The South African state therefore introduced land reform programmes such as the 
Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme and Municipal 
Commonage Programme and their associated financial assistance packages in the 
form of LRAD grants (previously S/LAG) and grants to municipalities to acquire 
additional commonage.   
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A regulatory framework  
While markets have become liberalised and deregulated spheres within the 
economy, they also embody a degree of regulation and established boundaries for 
them to function effectively and usually operate in accordance with a regulatory 
framework, a set of rules and conventions that structure the actions of market 
participants. These provide an established mechanism for enforcing property rights 
and defining the roles of relevant institutions, as well as mechanisms for determining 
and regulating the value and price of land. North’s schema of the “rules of the game” 
and the existence of “norms of behaviour to constrain parties in interaction” 
(1989:1319) can be understood as part of the regulatory framework which informs 
the functioning of markets. In part, the regulatory framework is established through 
the contending powers that intersect within the market, but in addition, a role is 
played by the state and its agencies, to create a regulated environment in which the 
market can operate.  
 
The regulatory framework of the market is frequently discussed in terms of the state-
market paradigm. White’s analysis (1993) however, differs from this approach. He 
suggests that the conventional state-market paradigm “predisposes us to think in 
dichotomous terms of two distinct spheres: on the one side, there is the realm of 
politics which has to do with the state and other institutions making up the system of 
formal public politics; on the other side, there is the realm of economics in which 
economic agents of diverse kinds produce, exchange and distribute through the 
modality of markets. In the real world, of course, the realms of state and market, 
public, political and economic systems, are densely and inextricably intertwined” 
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(White, 1993: 4). Mackintosh reiterates that, “All markets are structured by state 
action: the only variation is how the terms of their operation are set” (1990: 50).  
 
There are a number of regulatory dimensions of the state’s involvement in the 
market. White (1993) suggests that at a superficial level, the state intervenes to 
facilitate market operations, correct market distortions, and achieve social or 
developmental goals – for example, the introduction and implementation of land 
reform programmes and associated financial assistance. However, “at a deeper 
level, the state’s involvement is pervasive; it is the source of a complex network of 
institutionalised arrangements which permeate markets and influence the way they 
operate: for example, the legal definition of property rights, licensing laws, 
standardisation of weights and measures, creation and validation of money and the 
regulation of contracts. At an even deeper level, state power saturates market 
exchange in invisible ways” (White, 1993:5), and can be described as an inherent 
quality redolent of Foucault’s “capillary” notion of power which acts to “permeate, 
characterise and constitute the social body” (Foucault, 1980:96).  
 
Rosset et al (2006) highlight the impact of the reorganization of the State in 
accordance with neoliberal principles and argue that it “forces any current demand 
for agrarian reform firmly within the parameters of a depoliticized (market-oriented) 
project. In this way, an emphasis on land reform alone ... avoids addressing the 
other dimensions of power and historical inequity that in the current agenda have 
marginalized both the rural sector and the rural poor”. Furthermore, they suggest 
that, “Through a combination of decentralization and an increased privatization of 
public services, the state comes to function as an organizational tool for market 
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expansion, and less a vehicle for representative democracy or resource distribution” 
(Rosset et al, 2006). 
 
Internationally, market-based land reform measures are showing an increasing 
tendency to rely more heavily on the state to play a central role in land acquisition 
and to intervene and regulate the market in a range of indirect ways. Besides the 
South African state’s intervention in and regulation of the land market in its protection 
of private property as enshrined in Section 25 of the Constitution (Republic of South 
Africa, 1996), the White Paper on South African Land Policy states that, “The 
challenge is to find a way of redistributing land to the needy, and at the same time 
maintain public confidence in the land market” (DLA, 1997b:17). To the extent that 
there is an acknowledgement of market failure and the existence of historical 
inequalities and contestation, the post-1994 South African State was prompted to 
intervene in the land market via mechanisms such as the land reform programme 
and has provided corrective remedies in the form of land reform grants and limited 
support services to land reform beneficiaries – thus confirming that the land market 
on its own is not an effective redistribution mechanism. Its intervention is essentially 
focused on creating enabling mechanisms for certain categories of resource-poor 
land seekers to engage in the land market by providing and determining grant 
allocations, ensuring that the legal requirements are met, and directing buyers and 
sellers to sources of technical advice.  
 
Besides the institutional interventions that regulate the market, a key element of the 
regulatory framework is the valuation of land and the guiding parameters for the 
pricing of land. Given the commodification of land and the view of land as a 
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speculative asset, the value of land is primarily understood by the market in terms of 
its price. The South African state has adopted an approach which places emphasis 
on the transaction of land based on negotiated prices. According to Sibanda, “In the 
South African experience, the State considers the negotiation of prices to be a cost-
effective way of implementing the constitutionally mandated land reform 
programmes" (Sibanda, 2003:21). This being the case, land price in relation to the 
size and availability of grants is a major factor in determining whether land can be 
acquired by resource-poor land seekers through the land reform programme, and 
can potentially act as the primary brake on land acquisition.  
 
In summary, the following features and their sets of associated assumptions 
regarding the characterisation and role of the land market underpin much of the 
current South African market-based land reform policy:  
● Land is viewed as a commodity and must be available for transaction; 
● Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange must exist;  
● Adequate levels of purchasing power and available capital must be present;  
● A regulatory framework that facilitates and oversees land market activity must 
operate. 
 
The substance of the policy assumptions associated with these key features 
necessary for land market transaction are explored in the chapters which follow; with 
an emphasis on whether the South African state’s intervention in the land market 
through its various land reform programmes and associated support systems is able, 
in practice, to overcome the obstacles faced by resource-poor new entrants to the 
market.  
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Chapter Three - Methodology and key research questions 
 
 
An exploration of the claim made by land sector agencies – and more 
particularly by the Surplus People Project (SPP) – that insufficient land is 
available for land reform and that resource-poor rural people’s attempts to 
acquire land through the land market are frustrated, required a critique of the 
nature and role of the land market and its performance within South Africa’s 
market-based land reform programme. In doing so, the overlap between the land 
market as conceptualised by land reform policy makers and real land markets as 
experienced by resource-poor land-seekers was probed and the following research 
questions defined: 
• What are the operational dynamics of the land market? 
• How do these dynamics enable or hinder the acquisition of land by 
prospective land reform beneficiaries? 
• What has been the experience of those trying to acquire land through 
market-based land reform? 
 
Methodological framework 
A limited number of studies have been undertaken which explore the workings of the 
land market in South Africa. The work of Aliber and Mokoena (2000, 2002 & 2003) 
provides a profile of how the redistribution programme intersects with the rural land 
market in specific contexts and offers policy suggestions regarding how existing 
limitations can be remedied. Studies undertaken by Lyne and Darroch (2001), and 
Graham and Lyne (1999) focus on regional analyses of land redistribution via the 
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land market in the province of KwaZulu Natal and highlight the peculiarities of each 
region and the interaction of these on the local land market and vice versa.  
 
In response to the claim made by land sector agencies as outlined above and their 
expressed need for a more comprehensive explanation for why resource-poor land-
seekers find it difficult to acquire land, this study focuses on an examination of the 
socio-economic and political factors which militate against them – and provides a 
critique that draws on a political economy approach. 
 
The study’s methodological framework draws on an agrarian political economy 
perspective, as used by theorists such as Akram-Lodhi (2007) and Courville (2005), 
amongst others. This approach provides scope to consider the various contexts and 
processes involved in land transactions and the extent to which these are 
determined by the socially embedded character of these transactions and framed by 
the politics of policy-making. It is argued that land cannot solely be viewed as an 
economic commodity and that markets are not neutral institutions in which 
participants are equal players. 
 
Within this methodological framework, the data gathering technique used in this 
study draws on what Azfar (2002:6) refers to as “analytic narrative”. Azfar uses this 
term to denote a method that combines theoretical predictions (analytic) with 
anecdotal and historical description (narrative), based on document analysis, 
interviewing relevant actors and “seek(ing) to understand the actor’s preferences, 
their perceptions, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the 
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expectations they form, the strategies they adopt and the constraints that limit their 
action” (Azfar, 2002:6). 
 
Azfar suggests that in-depth interviews are useful for identifying human motivations 
and that a combination of an analysis of quantitative data and in-depth interviews 
may provide the best empirical strategy, where the quantitative data provides some 
information of a more factual basis that can be used to substantiate the study’s 
findings, and in-depth interviews which are used to validate or qualify these, provide 
anecdotes and understand motivations. These two techniques, in conjunction with an 
analysis of broader secondary sources and documentary evidence, contribute to an 
“analytic narrative” which allows for the links between different levels of institutions 
and performance – in this instance the agents of market-based land reform policy 
and the workings of the real land market – to be explored. The motivation for 
adopting an “analytic narrative” was to facilitate the emergence of a detailed profile 
of the nature and dynamics of local land markets and the experiences of those 
attempting to engage in them. This method lends itself to  enable the researcher to 
ascertain whether there is congruence between the more abstracted notion of the 
land market as reflected in much of the land reform policy, and the ‘behaviour’ of real 
markets and the experience of land-seekers in their attempts to acquire land.  
 
 
Method of data gathering  
 
Drawing on Azfar’s “analytic narrative”, a theoretical framework based on 
international and local debates as found in the literature on market-based land 
reform and an analysis of policy frameworks was developed (See Chapter 2). The 
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conceptualisation and assumptions made by proponents of the market-based 
approach and by South African policy makers regarding the nature and role of the 
land market as the central tenet of market-based land reform were explored. A 
synthesis of the key features of the land market and the policy assumptions which 
underpin market-based land reform was then developed.  The elements of this 
synthesis were then matched against the documented experiences and needs of 
prospective land reform beneficiaries and the workings of real markets. In order to 
ascertain whether there was any correlation between the intended outcomes and 
assumptions of market-based policy and the experience of resource-poor land 
seekers in their attempts to engage in real markets it was necessary to obtain 
concrete evidence and to identify appropriate research sites.   
 
The study’s research sites are located in the Districts of Namaqualand in the 
Northern Cape and the West Coast in the Western Cape. The Magisterial Districts of 
Kamiesberg and Hantam in the District of Namaqualand, and the Magisterial Districts 
of Bergrivier, Cedarberg and Matzikama in the West Coast District were selected. 
These form part of the operational areas of the SPP and the organisation enabled 
me to access communities and land reform projects in these areas, thereby 
providing an entry point for the research and data gathering.  The selection of these 
districts also enabled access to data across two provinces and potentially provided 
differing insights into the geographic and socio-political dynamics that may impact on 
the way in which prospective land reform beneficiaries are able to access the land 
market and how local land markets might function in different contexts. The 
experiences of rural people’s attempts to acquire land in the arid regions of 
Namaqualand with its extensive grazing lands, and in the better-resourced West 
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Coast potentially provided the scope for a range of dynamics and experiences in 
differing contexts.   
 
Three prospective land reform initiatives from across the research site were 
identified for in-depth investigation and constituted the case studies. They include 
the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers' Association, located in the town of Brandvlei under 
the Hantam Magisterial District  of the Northern Cape; the Hondeklipbaai community 
under the Kamiesberg Magisterial District; and the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers' 
Forum in  Eendekuil under the Bergrivier Magisterial District of the Western Cape.  
 
The case study approach, which included in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions, was used because it enabled the researcher to access sufficient detail 
regarding multiple factors impacting on those attempting to acquire land through the 
land market within specific localities and provided an opportunity for the key research 
questions to be probed within a ‘real-life’ situation.  This approach enabled direct 
access to members of land reform initiatives and an insight into their experiences 
located within specific contexts. The findings from the case studies are more likely to 
approximate ‘reality’ than those that might be derived from constructing a series of 
concepts or solely through speculation (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:12) or from a 
disembodied generic study conducted at a provincial or national level. 
 
Members of the prospective land reform initiatives were interviewed. The intention 
was not to obtain a representative sample of the views of all prospective land reform 
beneficiaries across the research sites but rather to focus on three specific and 
known examples of land need and to track the experiences of these three 
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communities or projects over the period of the research study in order to examine 
the kinds of issues that these examples manifested. It was not known at the outset of 
the study whether their attempts to acquire land would be successful or not. The 
tracking of their experiences would enable a better understanding of the challenges 
and obstacles faced by different groupings of land-seekers in their attempts to 
interact with the land market. In so doing, the evidence obtained would contribute 
towards an assessment of the claim made by land sector agencies, and the extent of 
overlap between the espoused outcomes of market-based land reform policy and 
concrete attempts to address real land need.  
 
The case study approach offered a window into a unique set of circumstances within 
specific geographic and socio-economic locales which might or might not serve to 
confirm the broader findings of the study. The case study outcomes could potentially, 
though not necessarily, be indicative of trends found across the research sites. The 
intention was not to generalise from the case study evidence but rather to highlight 
the nature of the experiences of land seekers in these communities, to provide 
insights into the challenges they faced, to ascertain the level of support they received 
from service providers and the state, and potentially to indicate ways in which 
market-based land reform policy might be adapted. 
 
Adding to the evidence obtained from the three case studies, all agricultural land 
transactions, excluding those zoned as rural town allotments, that took place within 
the five year period from 1998 to 2002 and across five selected registration divisions 
(administrative designations of land areas falling under a magisterial jurisdiction for 
the purpose of land identification and registration) from within the two selected 
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Districts were analysed. The five registration divisions of Piketberg, Clanwilliam and 
Vanrhynsdorp in the Western Cape and Calvinia and Namaqualand in the Northern 
Cape were selected because they incorporate the case studies and are large 
enough to provide sufficient data about the nature of market activity to allow for 
‘saturation’ to occur (Neuman, 2000:418).  Table 1 below provides an outline of the 
research sites and case studies under review. 
Table 1: Research sites and case studies 
PROVINCE DISTRICT MAGISTERIAL 
DISTRICT 
REGISTRATION 
DIVISION 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF LAND-
SEEKING COMMUNITIES 
Northern 
Cape 
Namaqualand Kamiesberg Namaqualand Hondeklipbaai community on the 
west coast of Namaqualand 
Hantam Calvinia Brandvlei Opkomende Boere 
Vereeniging (Emerging Farmers’ 
Association) in the rural town of 
Brandvlei 
Western 
Cape 
West Coast Bergrivier Piketberg Bergrivier Kleinboere Forum 
(Small Farmers’ Forum), in the 
rural town of Eendekuil 
Cedarberg Clanwilliam  
Matzikama Vanrhynsdorp  
 
The five year time frame was considered adequate in order to detect trends in the 
nature of land transactions; allow for fluctuations in the level of market activity; and 
include the uptake of the SLAG and LRAD redistribution programmes.  
 
Document and data analysis  
The literature review of the international and local debates about land markets in 
both their idealised and real forms contributed to the formulation of the study’s 
theoretical framework and situated the land market within the debate about market-
based land reform in South Africa. In conjunction with the data analysis and case 
study interviews, the review of secondary sources and documentary evidence 
contributes to the “analytic narrative” and allows for links to be drawn between 
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market-based land reform policy and the workings of the real land market. Arising 
from the literature review, a synthesis was developed of the key features and policy 
assumptions regarding the functioning of land markets and the elements necessary 
for land market transactions. This synthesis provided the analytical framework for the 
empirical aspect of the study, and the findings arising from the case studies 
regarding the operation of real land markets are matched against it. 
 
Details of all agricultural land transactions during the period under review across the 
five registration divisions included in the research site were found in the title deeds 
relevant to these transactions. Copies of all the relevant title deeds were obtained 
from the Cape Town Deeds Office.  
 
Title deeds include the following information:  
• Property information, such as province and diagram number, extent 
(hectares) 
• Owners (whether there is more than one owner or if the property is held by a 
company, trust, etc.) 
• Endorsements (details of any bonds / other endorsements) 
• History (previous owners / title deeds) 
• Detail of any contracts relating to the person 
• Bonds (if any) 
• Statutory information registered against the owner of a property, including 
farm number, portion number, date of purchase, price paid, bonds lodged and 
bond holder. 
 
Relevant data was extracted and entered into a database spreadsheet and the data 
was analysed in terms of the following features, as per the five selected registration 
divisions and per year from 1998 to 2002 (inclusive):  
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● The number of transactions; 
● The size of the land being transacted; 
● The extent to which land was purchased or transacted through mechanisms 
other than the market (e.g. inherited estates, donations);  
● The identity of the new owners; 
● The price of the transacted land. 
 
The data was then qualitatively interpreted “for the purpose of discovering concepts 
and relationships in [the] raw data and then organizing these into a theoretical 
explanatory scheme” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:11). This included an analysis of the 
relationship between land size and the number of transactions that took place; the 
price of land that was transacted across the five registration divisions relative to the 
size of the land and the reported carrying capacity for the area; the number of land 
reform transactions relative to generalised market activity; the extent to which buyers 
already owned land, thereby indicating the level of land accumulation and 
concentration; the link between access to information and market access; and the 
impact of available finance on market access. The analysis also provided an 
indication of the nature and level of land market activity across the geographic 
locations and over time.  The gathered data was treated both descriptively and 
analytically (Neuman, 2000:122) and is presented in the findings section outlined in 
Chapter Five of this study.  
 
Data and information on all the registered land redistribution projects falling within 
the research sites was obtained from the relevant Provincial Land Reform Offices 
(PLRO) of the Department of Land Affairs. This data was matched against the data 
obtained from the analysis of registered title deeds to ascertain any overlap. The 
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number of land reform transactions were then presented as a proportion of the total 
transactions via the land market and superimposed against the level of generalised 
market activity.  This exercise provided an indication of the extent to which aspirant 
land reform beneficiaries were able to acquire land through the land market and their 
level of access to real land markets, relative to the general activity taking place in the 
land market.   
 
Interviews  
Interviews were undertaken with one hundred and seventy-three respondents from 
across the research sites, and included resource-poor land-seekers and members of 
land reform initiatives, staff of land sector agencies, academic researchers, 
representatives of organised agriculture, commercial farmers, representatives from 
local government structures, estate agents, representatives of the Land Bank and 
personnel in provincial and national offices of relevant government and private 
institutions, amongst others. The size of the respondent group allowed for sufficient 
data collection in order for “saturation” to occur (Morse, 1994:230, as cited in 
Neuman, 2000:418); to indicate trends across the research sites; and to provide a 
range of views from a variety of interest groups.  Table 2 details the categories and 
number of respondents that the researcher interviewed, and indicates the level of 
representation according to the various interest groups.  
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Table 2: Categories and number of respondents interviewed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data that was sought focused on the experiences of land-seeking people in their 
attempts to engage in the land market and acquire land. The data gathering methods 
consisted of one-on-one interviews using an open-ended interviewing instrument, 
focus group discussions and workshop sessions. The interviewing instrument was 
adapted to each interviewing context, so as to remain appropriate and draw out as 
much relevant information as possible. The open-ended interviewing instrument was 
viewed as appropriate because the aim was to gather ‘an authentic understanding’ of 
the experiences of people and according to Silverman (1993:10), open-ended 
questions are the most effective route towards this end. 
 
The data was analysed for patterns and relationships (Babbie et al, 2001) which 
included, for example, perceptions across the various respondent groups about 
whether land was being made available for land reform and possible reasons for this; 
Category of respondent Number of respondents Total 
 Hantam NQL West  
Coast 
Provincial & 
National 
representatives 
 
Community member who identified themselves 
as being landless; emerging farmer attempting 
to acquire land 
30 32 29  91 
Land sector NGO personnel and land sector 
researchers 
3 3 3 15 24  
Representative of organised agriculture 2 1 1  4 
Independent commercial farmer 2 1 1  4 
Department of Agriculture official 3 1 2 2 8 
Department of Land Affairs – national and 
provincial 
3 2 8 13 
Department of Labour 1 0 0  1 
Department of Public Works 1 0 1 2 
Representative of municipality/local government 
structure 
4 3 4  11 
Representative of the Land Bank 1 1  2 
Estate agent 2 2 3  7 
Mining company/corporate institution/private 
sector 
0 4 1  5 
Representative of SanParks 0 1 0  1 
TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS: 52 48 47 26 173 
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attitudes regarding racism; whether prospective beneficiaries felt that they were in a 
position to engage in land transactions; the role of the Department of Land Affairs 
and the impact of its policies and procedures on the scope and pace of land 
redistribution; the availability of grants and state support services; and perceptions of 
social inclusion or exclusion, amongst others. It was envisaged that the data would 
provide insights into people’s experiences and perceptions of the land market and 
the extent to which they felt it was accessible to them or effective as a mechanism 
for acquiring land.  
 
It was intended that an amalgam of the findings arising from the analysis of the title 
deeds, the overview of the number of land reform transactions relative to the general 
level of market activity, and the documented experiences of people attempting to 
engage in the land market would serve to provide insights into the workings and 
efficacy of real, localised land markets and the extent to which they correspond to 
the intended outcomes as espoused by the proponents of the market-based 
approach to land reform.  
 
Limitations  
The process of gathering and systematising data across the two provinces of the 
Northern and Western Cape proved to be a challenge in terms of the integrity, 
consistency of format, and quality of information and data provided; and the differing 
approaches adopted for implementing, recording and sharing information regarding  
land reform initiatives by the different PLROs. Differences and inconsistencies were 
noted regarding the different approaches adopted by government departments in 
implementing land reform projects and programmes, the systems used for 
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monitoring and recording data, and in capturing information regarding the status and 
progress of land reform initiatives. These factors hindered the research process and 
may have introduced a degree of distortion that could not be avoided. 
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Chapter Four – Background to the case studies 
 
This thesis examines three case studies of land reform initiatives located in 
Brandvlei, Hondeklipbaai and Eendekuil and which fall respectively within the 
registration divisions of Calvinia, Namaqualand and Piketberg (See map below). 
 
 
 
 
 
Map showing location of case studies and research areas under review in the Northern and Western Cape 
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The case studies provide qualitative and substantive anecdotal information about the 
experiences of resource-poor land-seekers attempting to acquire or access land 
through the land market as the central mechanism of the land redistribution 
programme, and offer insights into perceptions of land availability and the way in 
which local land markets work.  An overview of the case studies is provided here; the 
detailed findings and analysis are presented in Chapter five. 
 
The first case study of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers' Association is located in the 
Hantam Karoo region of the Northern Cape and falls within the Calvinia registration 
division. It highlights the challenges confronting small-scale farmers trying to access 
land through the Department of Land Affairs’ Municipal Commonage Programme.  
 
The second case study is that of the Hondeklipbaai community in the Namaqualand 
registration division and illustrates the lack of land available on the open market and 
the effect of this on a community that had previously been dispossessed of its land. 
The community attempted to acquire land utilising a range of land reform options – 
including both Restitution and Redistribution – none of which proved fruitful.  
 
The third case study outlines the experience of the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers' 
Forum of Eendekuil, under the Piketberg registration division in the Western Cape, 
and illustrates the attempts of small-scale farmers to obtain support from the Land 
Bank and to access LRAD grants and external financial assistance in order to 
acquire land for their commercial agricultural activities.  
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CASE STUDY ONE – The Brandvlei Emerging Farmers' Association 
“… Some people have no land and desperately need land, while other people have 
lots of land and don’t always treat the land as if it is very precious to them. They just 
have it and it’s there for them every day when they wake up. Sometimes people take 
their land for granted. This makes them to not understand how it is for people who do 
not have land and who keep looking and hoping.” – A small-scale farmer in the 
Hantam karoo. 
 
The Brandvlei Opkomende Boere Vereniging (Emerging Farmers’ Association) 
consists of a group of 26 farmers from the small town of Brandvlei, located 120 km 
north-east of the town of Calvinia in the Hantam Karoo region of the Northern Cape. 
The Hantam Karoo lies to the east of the town of Vanrhynsdorp and the Vanrhyn’s 
Pass over the Kamiesberg Mountains.  The region includes the towns of Calvinia, 
Niewoudtville, Brandvlei, Loeriesfontein, Williston, Fraserberg, Middelpos and 
Sutherland. 
 
The area is sparsely populated with vast areas of white-owned farmland and game 
parks stretching between the towns. The land is relatively dry, receiving 
approximately 50 to 200mm of rain annually.  The chief agricultural activity in the 
area is sheep farming. In general, the carrying capacity of the land allows for one 
ewe per 12 hectare, thus necessitating a relatively large farming area, preferably 
with both summer and winter grazing. 
 
Individual members of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmer's Association (EFA) had for a 
number of years attempted to farm livestock on various small parcels of land that 
they had access to, including land on farms where they worked as farm workers and 
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were reliant on the goodwill of the landholders for the continuation of this 
arrangement. Between them, the members of the EFA owned a total of 411 sheep 
and 246 lambs and were unable to increase their stock numbers due to a lack of 
available grazing land at their disposal. They therefore decided in 1998 to approach 
the Hantam Municipality and request access to the town’s existing commonage for 
grazing purposes.  They obtained permission to utilise 5,710 hectare of the town’s 
existing commonage, based on a lease contract with the Municipality. However, the 
Department of Agriculture intervened and indicated that almost half of this land had 
been over-used by the previous commercial lessee, and the Department required 
that this land lie fallow for two years in order to regenerate. This meant that the 
small-scale farmers had to be accommodated on just 3,365 hectares, where only 
338 ewes could be managed. It was therefore critical that additional commonage 
was acquired in order to accommodate the farming needs of the existing EFA 
members as well as the growing number of people within the community who were 
showing interest in farming (Interview with EFA, August 2003). 
 
In 2002, the EFA identified a farm for sale that suited their needs – a farm of 5,438 
hectare called Remhoogte, adjoining the existing municipal commonage on the 
outskirts of the town of Brandvlei. The owner indicated that he was willing to sell for 
land reform purposes. Members of the Brandvlei EFA suggested that his reason for 
selling was linked to the location of the land: “He (landowner) keeps offering the farm 
to the EFA because it is surrounded by commonage land. This commonage is being 
used by other commercial farmers but their lease expires at the end of October and 
he is afraid that this land will be leased to emerging farmers and that he will be 
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surrounded by them – he’s worried about stock theft and dogs. Also, he hasn’t got 
offers from anyone else” (Interview with chairperson, Brandvlei EFA, October 2003). 
 
The EFA consulted the Municipality and requested that it submit an application to the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) to purchase Remhoogte as additional municipal 
commonage, using the Grant for the Acquisition of Land for Municipal Commonage. 
In accordance with the terms of such an arrangement, the title deed would be held 
by the Municipality and the land utilised by the EFA based on the terms contained in 
a lease agreement. The Municipality agreed with the EFA’s motivation and 
approached the DLA regarding the purchase. 
 
The landowner agreed to hold open a four-month option to the DLA and Municipality 
to buy the land at the price of R150 per hectare. This four month time-frame had, 
however, elapsed before the DLA approached the owner to engage in negotiations, 
by which time the asking price had increased to R160 per hectare. According to the 
landowner, this increase was unavoidable due to loss of production experienced by 
the owner while waiting for confirmation of the sale and a general increase in land 
prices in the area. However, the DLA indicated to the landowner and Municipality 
that it was only prepared to pay R155 per hectare (Interview with Chair of EFA, 
October 2003; Interview with DLA official responsible for negotiations, August 2003). 
The DLA was urged by the Municipality and the EFA to reconsider and appeals were 
made to its office in Kimberley, but the DLA insisted that the asking price was too 
high by R5 per hectare and it therefore terminated negotiations and the deal fell 
through (Interview, Councillor of Brandvlei Municipality, August 2003). The additional 
cost of R5 per hectare would have amounted to an additional R27,190 on the total 
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purchase price. According to a Municipal Councillor, “The Municipality offered to pay 
the R5 per hectare difference in the price but he (the DLA official) said that the DLA 
could not agree to this. The Municipality would have been able to pay this difference 
from the income from meent (commonage) leases – we could have paid it off in a 
year or so” (Personal interview, August 2003).  
 
A Northern Cape PLRO official based in the Kimberley office confirmed that the 
Department believed the price to be too high and the official dealing with the 
Remhoogte negotiation at the time commented: “Remhoogte was ideally situated but 
the key problem was the price. We could not go above the market indicated price.  
The DLA does not want to be blamed for increasing land prices and one therefore 
has to stick to the limits. I agree that there was not a big difference in the price and 
what DLA could afford to pay but we needed to make the point that we are only 
prepared to buy land at an appropriate price ... Unfortunately, the need for land by 
the emerging farmers in that area still exists” (Personal interview, DLA official 
responsible for negotiating the purchase of Remhoogte, August 2003). 
 
An official of the Northern Cape PLRO commented: “Given the high selling price 
asked by the landowner of Remhoogte, this transaction was cancelled. Acquisition of 
this land would have meant that Land Affairs, especially the Northern Cape PLRO, 
was deliberately frustrating the land market. Had the PLRO continued with this 
transaction it would have been regarded as fruitless expenditure in terms of the 
PFMA (Public Finance Management Act, 1999)” (Personal interview, PLRO Official, 
Northern Cape, August 2003). 
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The EFA felt that given that available land was so scarce, the DLA should have 
pushed harder to acquire Remhoogte. Comments made by a small-scale farmer 
highlight the difficulty of finding available land:  
“It is very seldom that a farm comes onto the market that is adequate for our 
needs and that is within the average price range in the area. It’s not as though 
we can pick and choose. When an option like this comes onto the market it is 
a gift on our doorstep, a miracle and yet this miracle has been lost to us 
because of DLA’s approach to land reform. I don’t think that DLA really 
understands the land crisis. There simply is no land available, certainly not at 
an affordable price. We can’t understand the logic of DLA” (Interview with EFA 
member, August 2003). 
 
There was also a concern on the part of the EFA that the valuation of the farm that 
had been commissioned by DLA was inadequate and it was alleged that no proper 
attempt had been made to inspect the entire property and its infrastructure – 
according to comments from small-scale farmers in the area, the valuation was 
cursory and the valuation reports were not made available to the EFA or the 
Municipality. The DLA did not engage with the Municipality during the course of the 
negotiations with the landowner and the Municipality was simply presented with a 
final decision (Interview with EFA members, August 2003).  
 
After the failure of the EFA’s attempts to have Remhoogte purchased as additional 
commonage, the EFA set up a sub-committee that was tasked with looking for other 
available land. This Committee has since indicated that they have not been able to 
find any land. They showed interest in a more remote farm that came onto the 
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market but according to the EFA, when they approached the landowner it was taken 
off the market. They believed that the landholder’s response was based on prejudice 
and a lack of preparedness to sell for the purpose of land reform. They suggested 
that the manner in which the DLA had dealt with the Remhoogte negotiations may 
have caused the landholder to feel disinclined to engage in a land reform initiative 
(Interview with EFA members, October 2003).   
 
CASE STUDY TWO – Hondeklipbaai Community 
“In the old days we were living and farming and fishing here. Then from the 1960s 
the mines came and the gates were shut – we were enclosed. We lost our land, we 
had to get rid of our livestock and we were forced to pay taxes. To this day, we still 
have no land” - A leader of the Hondeklipbaai community, August 2003.  
 
The village of Hondeklipbaai is situated on the West Coast of Namaqualand, 80 
kilometres west of the town of Garies in the Northern Cape. The region is semi-arid 
and large tracts of land are needed for extensive livestock and grain farming. The 
climatic conditions are harsh, with very little rainfall, a scarcity of drinking water, little 
vegetation for grazing animals and the constant threat of drought, overgrazing and 
soil degradation. The landscape has been further degraded by mining activity, with 
very little rehabilitation of the soil and vegetation being evident. 
 
The key landowners in the area are the mining companies of de Beers, AlexCor, 
Okiep Copper Company (OCC), Black Mountain (Anglo American), and Blesberg, a 
private mine. In addition, the State owns large tracts of land which is leased to the 
TransHex Mining Company. The community is hemmed in by properties owned by 
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mining and fishing companies, the State, game parks and private commercial 
farmers (Interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, August 2003).   
 
The village of Hondeklipbaai is located within the boundaries of the “Farm Hondeklip 
Bay”, also known as the Hondeklip Reserve, an area of approximately 2,162 
hectares in extent. In terms of the Certificate of Registered Crown Title 292/1954, the 
Farm Hondeklip Bay is state-owned land. On 1st January 1954, the area was 
proclaimed the “Local Area of Hondeklip Bay”. In 1980, the Divisional Council of 
Namaqualand was granted jurisdiction over the state-owned portion of Hondeklip 
Bay.  This responsibility was then passed to the Namaqualand Regional Services 
Council in 1990 and then to the Kamiesberg Municipality in the mid-1990s as a result 
of the new municipal demarcations (Govender, 1997). 
 
The Hondeklipbaai community has a history of occupation of the Hondeklip Bay 
Reserve which goes back to the nineteenth century. Senior residents in the village 
make the following claim:  
“Die gebied was plat en uitgestrek met geen beperking op weivelde. Geen 
grensdrade of bakens wat gedien het as grense tussen Hondeklipbaai en 
Kommagas. Veeboere het seisoenaal rondgetrek met hul vee en 
matjieshuise. Daar is dus bewyse van ou veeposte en oorblyfsels van 
okkupasie. [The area was flat and stretched out with no limits on grazing. 
There were no boundary fences or beacons which indicated boundaries 
between Hondeklipbaai and Kommagas. Livestock farmers migrated 
according to the seasons with their livestock and thatched dwellings. Today 
you can still find traces of old animal posts and signs of occupation]” 
(Govender, 1997). 
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As a result of the forced removals under Apartheid and the protection of diamond 
mining interests in the area, the community living in Hondeklipbaai was 
dispossessed of its land in the 1960s. Today, there are approximately 600 people 
living in the Hondeklipbaai township village. Of these, at least 40 indicated a strong 
desire for land in order to farm or pursue other marine and mining-based enterprises 
(Community focus group discussion, August 2003). People continue to struggle to 
find available land to carry out their multiple livelihood strategies. According to 
residents:  
“There are economic opportunities such as perlemoen and oysters but we 
can’t expand and do the work because we do not have the land to run the 
operation from. A group of women want to start an oyster project but they 
have no land. As soon as you start to just use the land that is sitting there 
then suddenly the owners or whoever start complaining and tell us we can’t 
be there and chase us away. Just to get land or rights to use the land or to 
fish, you have to have a lot of money. People don’t have money and so they 
just stay away from  engaging in these issues. They just stay on the side and 
then they can’t develop” (Interview with residents, August 2003). 
 
Arising from a series of workshops conducted in the community, an analysis of the 
residents' current livelihood activities was undertaken. It reflects that many residents 
are living below the poverty datum line and are struggling to support themselves and 
their families. Most are reliant on State social grants and pensions. All those 
interviewed indicated a desire to improve their standard of living and to explore other 
livelihood strategies and options – the acquisition of land was viewed as critical and 
central to realising this and reflected the multiple values and meanings community 
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members placed on the land (Findings of community workshop, Hondeklipbaai, 
August 2003).  
 
Residents indicated that:  
“There are no more jobs in the mining industry in this area – mines have been 
overworked and most are rationalising and down-scaling – and so farming is 
the only option available to us as a source of income and livelihood. We need 
land in order to farm” (Interview, August 2003). 
 
Members of the Hondeklipbaai community indicated that they had received very little 
support in their attempts to acquire land and commented on the DLA and 
Department of Agriculture’s approach to land reform implementation work, 
suggesting that the government was not proactive:  
 “DLA and the Department of Agriculture do not help us find land. The 
 community has to look for land and once we’ve identified it we have to 
 approach the DLA or Agriculture. It seems that there is a conservative 
 approach from Agriculture – if there’s no willing seller then that’s just too 
 bad” (Interview, August 2003). 
 
The community had attempted to acquire land through both the Restitution and the 
Redistribution programmes of land reform. The first claim for the restitution of their 
land rights submitted on behalf of the residents was lodged by the Hondeklipbaai 
Development Forum in 1994. However, the Regional Land Claims Commission was 
of the opinion that Restitution was not the appropriate mechanism to be utilised in 
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this instance and the land claim was rejected. This resulted in a claimant community 
in Hondeklipbaai that:  
“... feels deeply aggrieved and lives with a sense of its rights having been 
eroded. The oral testimony of its members, especially its senior members is a 
tale of woe, of poverty and no promise of relief. Their accounts of what 
happened hold on doggedly to their conviction of loss of rights to the land” 
(Govender, 1997:21). 
 
After the failure of their attempt to acquire land through the Restitution Programme, 
the Hondeklipbaai community continued to attempt to find land in the hope of 
acquiring it through the LRAD programme. However, they have had no success in 
finding available land and are of the opinion that there is no land currently available 
for purchase in the area. The residents view the land market as static and as 
essentially being an internal market in the event that land does become available for 
transaction. They indicated frustration about the LRAD process saying that they are 
responsible for finding land and that they can only approach the DLA for assistance 
or a grant once they have a degree of certainty about the owner’s preparedness to 
sell for land reform purposes. They indicated that it is virtually impossible for an 
owner to have faith in the negotiating process and to commit to engage in a land 
reform negotiation if the buyers themselves have no certainty about whether their 
grant application will be approved or how much money they will be granted 
(Interview with Hondeklipbaai residents, August 2003). 
 
According to members of the community, they suspect possible collusion amongst 
private landowners in a bid to keep them out. They have the sense that land for sale 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
is not publicly advertised and that landowners only inform their neighbours and 
relatives. The community views this as a 'closed circuit' which excludes them 
(Interview with Hondeklipbaai residents, August 2003). 
 
Land that could potentially become available is state-owned and is leased by the 
TransHex mining company. The Company indicated that it was rehabilitating mining 
areas and was due to hand land back to the state within two years (Interview, 
TransHex management, September 2003). Out of desperation, a number of the 
Hondeklipbaai residents are hoping to acquire this land, but while it is well-situated it 
may be unsuitable as it has become too degraded and will require an extensive 
period of re-vegetation and rehabilitation prior to being viable for agricultural 
purposes (Interview, Department of Agriculture, September 2003). 
 
During 2003 and following a series of community meetings, the residents of 
Hondeklipbaai organised themselves into a Grondsoek Kommittee (Land-seeking 
Committee) in order to streamline and co-ordinate their attempts to access land and 
to network and engage with existing forums that may assist them with accessing 
land. 
 
The community was concerned that even though they had raised their land needs 
with the Department of Land Affairs and with the mining companies in the area, the 
de Beers Mining Company was in the process of selling off land to the Namaqualand 
Parks Board and the State was not providing adequate assistance to support 
residents in their attempts to acquire land (Community workshop, Hondeklipbaai, 
August 2003). 
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The generalised level of despair expressed by residents of the Hondeklipbaai 
community is captured in the words of a land seeker and aspirant farmer: 
“The land is dry, the grants are dry, and our pockets are dry” (Interview, 
August 2003). 
 
 
CASE STUDY 3 – Bergrivier Small-scale Farmers Association  
“It was dark for us, but it was light for them”– Comment made by a small-scale 
farmer from Eendekuil, regarding his Association’s experience of interacting 
with the Land Bank and a consortium of commercial farmers, August 2003.  
 
Eendekuil is a village settlement that is located approximately 30 kilometres north of 
the town of Piketberg in the Piketberg registration division. It falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Bergrivier Municipal District of the Western Cape.  
 
Private landowners and commercial farmers own approximately 90% of the 
agricultural land in this region. The land is used for commercial agriculture and 
increasingly for private game farms and wild life reserves. The remaining land is 
owned by private companies engaged in  cement and sand mining and processing, 
with mining and industrial sites at Saldanha Bay; the Municipalities of Saldanha, 
Matzikama, Bergrivier, Swartland and Cedarberg each own commonage land; and 
Christian orders own extensive tracts of land at mission stations at Abbotsdale, 
Wittewater, Genadendal, Wuppertal, Genadenberg and Moravia. 
 
There were initially two groups of small-scale farmers in the Eendekuil area – the 
Sandveld Farmer’s Association and the Eendekuil Small-scale Farmers’ Association. 
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Both groups had been interested in acquiring the farm Goergap at the time that the 
former owner of the farm had become insolvent and the farm was sequestrated and 
placed under the administration of the Land Bank. The farm has a land area of 3,000 
hectares and is located in the Eendekuil area of the Bergrivier Magisterial District in 
the Piketberg registration division. 
 
During the course of discussing how they might apply for redistribution grants from 
the DLA through the West Coast District Assessment Committee (DAC)v in order to 
purchase Goergap, the two associations agreed to merge and make a single 
application to the DAC. They formed the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers’ Association, 
with a combined membership of 260 emerging farmers.  
 
Due to the introduction of a moratorium on all redistribution grant allocations in 2000, 
the EFA was unable to access any land reform grants. They therefore approached 
the Land Bank in two capacities – both as the administrator (and therefore the seller 
of the land) and as a potential lender of finance – in order to purchase Goergap from 
the Bank. They requested assistance from the Bergrivier Municipality in the form of 
providing support and motivating for their intended land reform initiative (Interview, 
Bergrivier EFA, September 2003).  
 
According to the EFA, at the time that they made their initial application to the Land 
Bank there were no commercial farmers showing interest in Goergap. During the 
course of their contact with the Bank, however, they came to believe that the Bank 
was “not interested in our application. We felt ignored and the Land Bank treated us 
as if we did not know about farming and about how to work the land” (Interview with 
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EFA members, September 2003). They approached the Land Bank on numerous 
occasions and provided a motivation as to why their application for a loan to 
purchase Goergap should be considered favourably.   In addition, the EFA met with 
the DLA regarding the status of their application for a grant in light of the moratorium 
on all new grant applications and the implications of this on the registration of their 
intended project at Goergap (Interview with EFA members, September 2003).   
 
During the course of lodging their application and feeling that they were not making 
adequate progress, the EFA was approached by a business consultant who became 
interested in purchasing Goergap. The consultant proposed that the EFA join him in 
establishing a joint venture in the form of a Trust, with the EFA having a 51% share 
and the consultant having a 49% share. He had indicated that on the basis of funds 
from the offices of the Departments of Agriculture, Social Services and Economic 
Development and Tourism he could secure funding from Holland and that the farm's 
produce (export quality onions) would be exported to Holland. He acquired planning 
funds from the Department of Agriculture in order to develop a business and land 
management plan (Personal interview with business consultant, November 2003). 
 
The EFA then agreed to engage with the consultant to purchase the land and to 
embark on a joint venture. In March 2003 they jointly made an offer of R1 000 per 
hectare to the Land Bank as the administrator of Goergap. This amounted to a total 
offer of R2,9 million. When submitting their offer, they indicated in writing that they 
would be prepared to negotiate and to increase their offer if necessary, depending 
on the progress of the negotiations. However, according to the EFA, the Land Bank 
did not respond to their offer or to their various correspondence and instead offered 
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the property to a consortium of existing commercial farmers and landowners in the 
area, for R10 000 more than the EFA's initial offer (Interview with EFA, September 
2003). The EFA and consultant indicated that they would have been in a position to 
raise this additional sum had they been given to opportunity to do so (Personal 
interviews, September 2003). 
 
The chairperson of the EFA indicated that after receiving no acknowledgement or 
outcome from the Land Bank, he had contacted the relevant official at the Bank and 
requested reasons as to why they had not been granted the farm and/or why they 
had not been invited to increase their offer in order to match that of the competing 
consortium. Various explanations were given to the EFA, none of which they found 
to be satisfactory (Interview, EFA Chairperson, September 2003).  
 
The EFA viewed the Land Bank’s management of the situation as “unfair and 
unprocedural” (Interview, September 2003).  They believed that the Land Bank had 
acted in a discriminatory manner towards them, after having initially raised their 
expectations. The EFA was of the opinion that the state, through the DLA and the 
DAC, had not played its expected role of encouraging land reform and supporting 
small-scale farmers in their endeavours (Interview, September 2003). When 
contacted by the researcher, the Land Bank indicated that, “The outcome had been 
determined by market forces” and that it was not in a position to consider 
“uncompetitive bids” (Personal interview, Land Bank official, September 2003).  
 
The above case study sketches provide the background and the evidence base for 
the detailed analysis of the land market as presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five – Findings of the study 
 
This chapter presents the study's findings, including narrative and anecdotal detail 
from the case study interviews and a quantitative analysis of the title deeds of all 
agricultural land transactions within the five year period under review. The 
presentation of these findings is structured according to features that are necessary 
for land market transactions to take place and the policy assumptions associated 
with these, as outlined in Chapter two.    
 
Land as a commodity available for transaction 
This section focuses on land as a commodity, its availability for transaction on the 
land market, the extent of land market activity across the five registration divisions 
and case study areas, and the fundamental impact of the lack of land on the market 
and the potential for land seekers to acquire land.  
 
Land as a commodity  
In each case study, the respondents did not view land simply as a commodity but 
highlighted the multiple values they placed on land and the significant effect that 
having access to land might have on their livelihoods, health and well-being. The 
multiple uses and livelihoods derived from land are highlighted by the Hondeklipbaai 
case study. Significantly, all respondents viewed access to land as an indicator of 
the realisation of social justice and a restoration of their rights (Interviews, 
community members, 2003). 
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The focus on a land parcel primarily as a commodity, without due consideration for 
the other values and uses associated with acquiring that particular land as well as 
the State’s focus on market value as the primary determinant of the value of land is 
starkly illustrated by the Brandvlei emerging farmers’ experience of attempting to 
acquire the farm Remhoogte as additional commonage. The value of the farm was 
viewed by the DLA solely in terms of its market value and in terms of its price as a 
commodity rather than the socio-economic and political impact which the acquisition 
might have had on those involved. The Department refused to purchase the land 
because the price was viewed as being above the scope of what constituted the 
market value by R5 per hectare. In the process, other values of significance to the 
willing buyers were lost sight of – its location and proximity to town, the lack of any 
other available land in the area, the use value, the potential to improve the 
livelihoods of the farmers and their families, the multiplier effect on the local 
economy, the impact of improved nutrition for the affected families, and the element 
of social justice and symbolic restoration of land to otherwise landless people in the 
area. 
 
The availability of land in the case study locales  
A fundamental ingredient for both the functioning of the land market and for 
implementing market-based land reform is an adequate level of activity in the 
market. In contrast to the need for an ‘elastic’ supply of agricultural land in order for 
there to be a vibrant land market (World Bank, 2003) and Gordillo and Boening’s 
(1999) warning regarding the need for a sufficient supply of land if market-based 
land reform is to be possible and affordable (as detailed in Chapter Two), the 
experience of land-seekers in the three case study  areas suggest that the lack of 
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available land for sale has resulted in an essentially static market within their locales  
and therefore in a stalling of land reform (Interviews with community members, 
August 2003; Department of Agriculture officials, October, 2003). In the 
Hondeklipbaai region of the Northern Cape, land-seekers indicated that there are at 
least 40 individuals seeking land at any one time, either as a group or as individuals, 
but that there is a zero supply of land available for transaction – thus indicating that 
there is effectively no land market in the area.   
 
The lack of available land in this region was confirmed by commercial farmers who 
had themselves been forced to purchase land far away from their existing farm/s in 
order to acquire additional grazing. In the words of a commercial farmer in the 
Hondeklipbaai area, “Land is scarce here. I ended up buying a farm 200km away 
because there were no farms in this area that were for sale” (Interview commercial 
farmer, Hondeklipbaai, November 2003). The fact that a successful commercial 
farmer who had available capital resources and was well-connected in the local 
farming community had found it so difficult to find land, suggests that it would be all 
but impossible for local resource-poor community members to find available land in 
the area.  
 
Similarly, the case studies of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers Association and the 
Bergrivier Small-scale Farmers Association also point to a land supply-demand ratio 
that does not respond to land need in the area. The latter group stated that there 
was a scarcity of affordable and appropriate land type and size available on the 
market (Interview, Bergrivier EFA, September 2003). In the words of an emerging 
farmer from Bergrivier: “It is very difficult for us to understand and believe it when we 
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are told that land reform is working and that the willing seller/buyer is the best route 
to go. There simply is no land available to us, even if we could afford to buy it. Part of 
the problem is that certain farmers have up to seven farms each ...  we cannot get 
our foot in the door. There’s a monopoly on land ownership here” (Interview, August 
2003). 
 
The DLA Northern Cape Provincial Office indicated, “There is a scarcity of land for 
purchase in the Hantam area.  It is our experience that even private purchases are 
not regular and this naturally contributes to relatively high land prices” (Interview, 
November 2003). However, in the absence of available land on the market, no 
alternative channels were sought by the DLA to acquire land for prospective land 
reform beneficiaries through alternative mechanisms such as expropriation, the 
purchase of a large tract of land with the potential for sub-division, or other forms of 
intervention. The market can therefore be said to be the determining factor in the 
progress and pace of land reform, with little or no alternative intervention made by 
the state over and above making grants available to aspirant beneficiaries. 
 
A factor that appeared to have impacted on land availability in the Namaqualand and 
Hantam Karoo region is the preparedness of the South African National Parks 
(SANParks) to pay relatively high prices for land. A number of commentators 
indicated that as a well-resourced buyer with an ambitious expansion plan, 
SANParks pushes up land prices and absorbs all available land in the area.  An 
estate agent in Namaqualand indicated that, “It is not uncommon for SANPARKS to 
pay 50% above the normal market value to get land in order to establish new game 
parks or extend existing ones. An example is that of the SANPark’s purchase of land 
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in the Garies area in order to extend the Namaqualand National Park. The nature of 
this kind of land transaction accompanied by a preparedness on the part of the buyer 
to purchase land at any cost, serves to destabilise the land market and impacts on 
those who wish to buy land but who cannot compete with the offers made by the 
Park” (Interview, October, 2003). 
 
The study found that the lack of available land in the three case study locales, more 
especially for the purposes of land reform, meant that there were extremely limited or 
non-existent local land markets in these areas and the local land markets were 
unable to meet the needs of resource-poor land seekers. This situation as found in 
the three case study locales points to policy failure in that the adoption of market-
based land reform and its reliance on the market is predicated on land being 
available and yet a number of the local land markets where the case studies are 
located were found to be very thin or static.   
 
Land market activity 
 
At a broader level, across all the five registration divisions under review – Piketberg, 
Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp in the West Coast region, and Calvinia and 
Namaqualand in the Northern Cape – the analysis of data based on the registered 
title deeds for all transactions of agricultural land from 1998 to 2002 indicated 
generalised activity across these local land markets, albeit with some registration 
divisions indicating higher average levels of activity than others. However, it is 
necessary to qualify the number of transactions by the amount (hectares) of land 
transacted and to consider the nature of the transactions which took place, including 
the identity of the new owners and the extent of land reform transactions.  The 
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various elements that constituted the level of land market activity were analysed and 
are presented below.   
 
● Number of transactions and land area 
A total of 1,841 portions of agricultural land were transacted across all registration 
divisions during the five-year period under review, as detailed in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Number, total area and size of agricultural land transactions in 5 registration divisions: 1998-2002 
Note: The number of agricultural properties is based on the number of portions of land, not the total number of title deeds 
registered for the area. This allows one to analyse the number of separate properties which could be transacted on the land 
market. A number of portions/properties typically make up a single farm. The number of farms indicates the number of 
agricultural properties registered under one farm number with the same title deed number for which at least one portion was 
transacted. 
 
The total of 1,841 parcels of transacted land constitutes 14% of the total 13,058 
registered agricultural land parcels in the five registration divisions under review. 
There was not a great deal of variation across the registration divisions and a 
breakdown per registration division revealed that 16% of all registered properties in 
the Piketberg and Namaqualand registration divisions were transacted, 14% in 
Clanwilliam and 13% in Vanrhynsdorp and in Calvinia, thus suggesting that levels of 
activity (at least in relation to the total number of parcels) was relatively even across 
the five divisions. 
 
Registration 
Division 
Piketberg Clanwilliam Vanrhynsdorp Calvinia Namaqualand Total: 
# existent agricultural 
properties registered 
in each reg. division 
2,204 2 ,491 3, 041 3 ,149 2 ,173 
13,058 existent agricultural 
properties registered 
# transactions 
(purchased & non-
purchased portions) 
347 346 381 409 358 
1,841 transactions 
# farms involved in 
transactions  125 131 138 249 189 
832 farms involved 
# hectares transacted 
(ha)  108,691 306, 110  250,757 631,810 730,482 
2,027,848 ha transacted 
(including non-purchased 
land) 
Average size of land 
transacted (ha) 313 885 658 1,545 2,040 
1,101 ha = av. size per 
transaction 
Percentage 
transactions of 
registered properties  
16% 14% 13% 13% 16% 
14% of total 13,058 
registered agric land 
parcels were transacted 
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As indicated in the table above, a total of 2,027,848 hectares of land was transacted 
across the five registration divisions with Namaqualand (730,482 ha) and Calvinia 
(631,810 ha) having the highest amount of land transacted followed by Clanwilliam 
(306,110 ha) and Vanrhynsdorp (250,757 ha), with Piketberg (108,691 ha) 
accounting for the least amount.    
 
The average size of transacted land was 1,544ha in Calvinia and 2,040ha in 
Namaqualand, with an average of 618 hectares across the three West Coast 
registration divisions.  
 
• Transactions of non-purchased and purchased land   
Land market activity cannot be understood simply as a total of the number of land 
transactions that were registered with the Deeds Office. Based only on the number 
of registered transactions, the market may appear to be making more land available 
on the open market than is in fact the case.  This study found that there were a 
sizable number of registered transactions that did not take place on the open market. 
A detailed analysis of the nature of these transactions and the extent to which the 
land involved was available to the open market was undertaken. For the purposes of 
this study, land transactions were analysed in terms of the following two categories: 
• “Non-purchase transactions” – those land transactions where no purchase 
price was paid, as in the case of inherited estates, donations, consolidations of 
properties, transfer of properties from the national state to provinces and from 
one municipality to another. 
•  “Purchase transactions” - those land transactions for which a purchase price 
was paid. 
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The bulk of land that was transacted during the period under review was purchased 
and amounted to 1,575,077 ha of the total of 2,027,848 ha, or 78% of the total 
transacted land. However, there was a significant amount of land (452,802 ha or 
22% of the total land transacted) that constituted registered transactions for which 
no purchase price was paid (See Table 4 below).  
 
Non-purchase transactions 
The non-purchase transactions effectively occurred outside the land market. While 
contributing to the apparent level of land market activity in terms of the number of 
registered transactions, the non-purchase land that was transacted might mislead 
one to believe that more land was available on the land market than was in fact the 
case.  
 
Table 4 (below) indicates the various categories of non-purchase transactions as 
identified on the title deeds included in the research study data, and details the 
number and amount of non-purchased land transacted within each category 
according to the registration division in which they were located. Entries on the 
deeds registry include information such as certificates of consolidated and registered 
titles; transactions denoted by “Nil” where no purchase price was paid because there 
was a private agreement between parties; donations; inherited estates; partitions in 
the case of land being sub-divided and a new portion being granted its own 
certificate; rectification in the event of a deed being lodged incorrectly; expropriation; 
and various forms of transfer from national to provincial or municipal jurisdictions. 
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● The transaction of estates 
The transaction of estates alone amounted to 291,564 hectares, or 14% of the total 
land area transacted and involved 225 transactions, which constituted 12 % of the 
total number of land transactions that took place during the period under review. By 
implication, 12% of all registered transactions were already outside the realm of the 
market and therefore not available for purchase for the purposes of land reform.    
 
Given that estates are usually passed down to family members or relatives, and that 
white people predominate in terms of existent land ownership, it can be assumed 
that this 12% of all transactions perpetuated the same white land ownership profile, 
and effectively excluded new entrants or potential land reform beneficiaries.  
 
● Donations 
The study established that a total of 11 donations were made, amounting to a total of 
20,610 ha. Of these, there were seven totalling 20,518 ha (1% of the total land area 
transacted) made to the South African National Parks in the Namaqualand 
registration division; two in the Piketberg division – one of 5 ha to a Workers’ Trust 
and the other (86 ha), to a company; and two in the Vanrhynsdorp division where 
both were portions (0.3ha and 0.15 ha) of the same farm were donated to a trust. 
 
As in the case of inherited estates, the land involved in these donations was not 
available for transaction on the open market, thereby further decreasing the amount 
of land ostensibly available to resource-poor land seekers. 
● Expropriations 
Expropriation in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 for public purposes other 
than land reform is not uncommon in South Africa. Much of the land that has been 
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expropriated has been for the purposes of public utilities and service routes such as 
roads and railways. This was confirmed by this study which found that a total of 21 
expropriations totalling 308 ha took place in the period under review, all of which 
were undertaken to provide land required by the para-statal, Transnet. There were 
no recorded expropriations for the purposes of land reform. 
 
Overall, this study found that approximately 23% of the total registered transactions 
for the period under review were for non-purchased land in the form of inherited 
estates, donations, expropriations and other transactions that were not accessible on 
the open market. 
Table 4: Agricultural land transactions involving non-purchased land: 1998-2002 
* The different types of coded non-purchased transactions are defined as follows: 
CCT = Certificate of Consolidated Title: A group of properties are amalgamated into one title deed as one property. 
CRT = Certificate of Registered Title: This is in order to separate a particular piece of property from a single title deed, including separating it from other 
properties. There is no change in ownership as a result of the transaction. 
“Nil” is indicated in instances where there is no purchase price in the deed because there is an agreement between the parties. 
Partition: One piece of land is sub-divided and the new portion is granted its own certificate - in terms of S.43 of the Deeds Registration Act. 
Rectification: In cases where a deed is lodged incorrectly and the entry is corrected by the Deeds Office. 
 
 
 
Category of 
non-
purchased 
land: 
 
Piketberg 
 
Clanwilliam 
 
Vanrhynsdorp 
 
Calvinia 
 
Namaqualand 
Total  # 
non-
purchase 
trans’ns 
Total ha 
non-
purchase 
trans’ns 
No:  No: ha No:   No:  ha No:   No: ha No:   No:  ha No:   No:  ha 
CCT* 15 6,790 10 7,497 16 7,884 3 9,465 7 32,977 51  64,613 
CRT* 2 155 14 410 6 2,552 1 1,243 13 7,430 36  11,791 
Donations 2 91 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 7  20,518 11  20,610 
Inherited 
estates 
 
42 
 
13,461 16 10,076 40 28,203 91 177,585 36 62,239 
 
225  291,564 
Nil* 1 2 0 0 5 7,612 5 1,986 30 141 41  9,741 
Partition* 4 2,284 2 2,595 0 0 3 10,724 7 8,124 16  23,728 
Rectification* 1 960 6 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 7  960 
Section 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15  25,004 15 25,004 
Section 239-
200/93 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4,304 0 0 5  4,304 
Expropriation 0 0 0 0 3 10 18 298 0 0 21  309 
Exchange 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 180 0 0 2  180 
 
TOTAL:  
67  
(of 
347) 
23,743 
48  
(of 
346) 
20,578 
72  
(of 
381) 
46,263 
128 
(of  
409) 
205,785 
115 
(of 
358) 
156,433 
430  
(of 1,841 
= 23%)  
452,802 
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Transactions of purchased land 
 
This section deals with land transactions where a purchase price was paid. Table 5 
below indicates the amount of land and number of transactions involving purchased 
land per annum for each registration division for the period under review. 
 
Table 5: Number of transactions and amount of land (ha) purchased per annum per registration division: 1998-2002 
Year of 
purchase 
date: 
Piketberg Clanwilliam Vanrhynsdorp Calvinia Namaqualand Total # 
per yr 
per reg 
div 
Total ha per 
annum 
No: No: ha No: No: ha No: No: ha No: No:  ha No: No: ha No: No: ha 
1998 18 7,,478 37 10,865 63 39,250 31 37,834 16 59,995 165 155,421 
1999 45 14922 66 16,519 53 51,577 69 121,210 29 110,893 262 315,121 
2000 68 18,868 82 211,612 63 50,463 74 113,979 65 155,349 352 550,270 
2001 103 32,850 70 32,356 90 47,264 82 95,310 79 146,740 424 354,520 
2002 46 10,830 43 14,180 40 15,970 25 57,693 54 101,072 208 199,745 
Total:  280 84,948 298 285,531 309 204,524 281 426,025 243 574,049 1411 1,575,077 
 
 
The total number of transactions that involved purchased land during the period 
under review was 1,411 with the Vanrhynsdorp area indicating the highest number of 
purchased transactions at 309, followed by Clanwilliam (298), Calvinia (281), 
Piketberg (280) and Namaqualand (243). 
 
The graph in Figure 1 below provides details of the number of purchased 
transactions per annum for each of the five registration divisions under review.  
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Figure 1: Number of purchased land transactions per annum per registration division: 1998-2002 
 
The trend across all registration divisions from 1998 to 2001 (inclusive) 
demonstrated an increase in the number of land transactions over time. The 
decrease reflected for 2002 could be explained by the fact that not all land 
transactions for that year had yet been registered with the deeds office.  In addition, 
an official from the Deeds Office suggested that the decrease in the number for 2002 
could be accounted for by the very high interest rates experienced during that year 
and the consequent impact on people's ability to buy and sell (Personal interview, 
November 2003). The constant increase in the number of transactions year on year 
demonstrated that the land market was not static and that there were growing levels 
of activity.  
 
The total amount of purchased land involved 1,575,077 hectares across the five 
registration divisions in the five-year period. The most land was purchased in 
Namaqualand (574,049 ha), followed by Calvinia (426,025 ha), Clanwilliam (285,531 
ha), Vanrhynsdorp (204,524 ha) and Piketberg (84,948 ha).  
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Of the total amount of land registered as agricultural/rural land (excluding rural town 
allotments) in each registration division, Clanwilliam’s agricultural purchased land 
transactions amounted to 39% of the total agricultural land in this registration 
division, while Piketberg amounted to 19%, Vanrhynsdorp to 16%, Namaqualand to 
11%, and Calvinia to 5%.vi These percentages reflect fairly high levels of land market 
activity.  
 
In general, the study found that the trend over time reflecting the amount (area) of 
land purchased in each area is the reverse of the trend regarding the number of 
transactions in each area - the areas that witnessed higher numbers of transactions 
were found to involve smaller land areas, while those which had lower numbers of 
transactions involved larger areas of land. While Namaqualand reflected the lowest 
number of purchased land transactions (243 out of the total of 1,411 or 17%) of the 
total number of purchased transactions, it indicated the highest amount of land being 
purchased, at 574,049 ha, or 36% of the total land purchased across the research 
sites during the period under review. On the other hand, Vanrhynsdorp had the 
highest number of transactions (309) but had the second lowest amount of land 
purchased (204,523 ha) thus indicating that these transactions involved smaller 
tracts of land than those purchased in an area such as Namaqualand. This data 
suggests that there was not a direct correlation between a high level of market 
activity (in the form of the number of transactions) and the amount of land that was 
transacted.  
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Figure 2 below shows that across the five-year period under review there was a 
generalised downward trend in the average sizes of property transacted for all 
registration divisions.  
 
 
Figure 2: Average size (ha) of purchased land per annum for each registration division: 1998-2002 
 
This profile suggests that owners were retaining the larger areas of land and 
shedding smaller available areas of land that they no longer required for productive 
use or could no longer afford to retain. It was evident that Namaqualand and Calvinia 
were consistently the regions where the highest average land area had been 
purchased, with average land sizes purchased in Namaqualand ranging from just 
under 4,000 hectares to just under 2,000 hectares over the five-year period, and 
revealing a gradual decrease in the average size of land transacted over the years. 
The average land areas purchased in the West Coast divisions of Piketberg, 
Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp reflect a gradual downward trend within a range of 
less than 1000 hectares over the five-year period under review.  
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• Land reform transactions relative to general land market activity  
As indicated above, the average level of activity on the land market was found to be 
considerable.  Having noted this level of activity, the study examined the extent to 
which land reform transactions constituted part of this activity.  
 
Table 6 below details the amount of land transacted for land reform purposes as a 
percentage of the total amount of registered land transactions from 1998 to 2002 
across the five registration divisions under review. Over the five year period, a total 
of 35 land reform projects were approved by the DLA, amounting to a land area of 
274,110 ha and constituting 13.5% of the total 2,027,848 ha transacted.   
 
Table 6: Land reform transactions as a percentage of total land transacted: 1998-2002 
 Time period: 
1998 to 2002 
Namaqualand 
Registration 
Division 
Calvinia 
Registration 
Division 
West Coast of Western Cape 
 (Piketberg, Vanrhynsdorp and  
Clanwilliam registration divisions) 
 Total: 
Land transacted 
for land reform 
(ha)  
 
 
259,053 
 
 
2,044 
 
 
13,013 
 
 
274,110 ha 
Number of land 
reform projects 
approved 
13 
(2 x LRAD  
11 x Commonage) 
3 
(3x LRAD) 
18 
(8 x LRAD 
10 x FWES 
1 x Commonage) 
35 
(13 x LRAD 
10 x FWES 
12 x commonage) 
Total ha 
transacted 
(purchased and 
non-purchased 
land) 
 
 
730,482 
 
 
631,810 
 
 
665,557 
 
 
2,027,848 ha 
Land reform 
acquisitions as  % 
of total amount of 
transacted land in 
reg divisions 
 
 
35% 
 
 
0.3% 
 
 
1.95% 
 
 
13.5% 
  
 
Across all the registration divisions under review, there were 13 approved LRAD 
projects, 12 Commonage and 10 Farm Worker Equity Share projects (FWES). The 
majority of commonage projects (11) were located in Namaqualand and the highest 
number of LRAD (8) and FWES (10) were located in the West Coast region. 
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Of the 887 transactions that occurred across the three registration divisions of 
Piketberg, Clanwilliam and Vanrhynsdorp in the West Coast District there were 18 
land reform projects amounting to a land area of 13,013ha and constituting 1.95% of 
the total 665,557 ha transacted in these three registration divisions. It must be noted 
that not all the land reform transactions in the West Coast District were direct land 
transfers to independent land reform beneficiaries because many of the transactions 
were for the purposes of establishing Worker Equity Share schemes, where 
beneficiaries might participate in or obtain shares in the business operation of a 
project but not necessarily become joint owners of the land itself (Fast, 1999; Tilley, 
2003). This result may therefore not accurately reflect the actual amount of land 
acquired by land reform beneficiaries themselves. 
 
Of the 243 transactions in the Namaqualand registration division, there were 13 land 
reform projects, of which 11 were Commonage and 2 were LRAD projects – these 
combined projects amounted to 259,053 ha and constituted 35% of the total 730,482 
ha transacted in this registration division.  
 
Of the 281 transactions in the Calvinia registration division, there were 3 land reform 
projects, all of which were LRAD initiatives. These amounted to 2,044ha or 0.3% of 
the total 631,810 ha transacted in this registration division. This registration division 
reflects the lowest amount of land transacted for land reform purposes and suggests 
very limited access by land reform beneficiaries in this area. This outcome accords 
with the case study finding of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers’ Association and its 
attempt to acquire commonage.  
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While the total percentage of 13.5% attributed to land reform across the five 
registration divisions far exceeds the national percentage for the amount of land 
transferred through land reform ( 4% of all agricultural land transferred to date - IRIN, 
2007), it is necessary to analyse this data in more detail. The data for land reform 
acquisitions indicates that the amount of land transacted for land reform purposes 
was uneven across and within the registration divisions, with Namaqualand showing 
the largest amount of land being transacted for land reform purposes while a 
community within this same registration division remained unable to access any land 
due to lack of available land on the market in that specific locale. The amount of land 
transacted for land reform purposes in Namaqualand was followed by the amount 
transacted in the West Coast and Calvinia, respectively. It must be noted that the 
relatively high Namaqualand figure and the peculiarities of this region’s land quality 
and price may have had a strong influence on the total average land area transacted 
for land reform when calculated across the five registration divisions.  
 
The data for Namaqualand is consistent with the profile across the entire Northern 
Cape where municipal commonage land transfers constituted 67% of all land 
redistributed, noting that commonage land is transferred to municipalities for use by 
small-scale farmers and not to individual beneficiaries as freehold title (Hall et al, 
2003). In addition, relative to other regions, land in the Northern Cape is cheaper due 
to the low carrying capacity of the land. This cheaper land price, combined with the 
need for large tracts of land due to the poor quality of the land, contributed to a large 
amount of land purchased in this area, relative to other areas of the country. It 
suggests that land redistribution is working under certain conditions, namely where 
cheaper land is available. While the figures for Namaqualand indicate increased 
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access to land by resource-poor land seekers in the form of municipal commonage, 
it does not indicate an increase in land acquisitions by them or a shift in the 
prevailing profile of land ownership, or an altering of the configuration of social 
relations in the rural areas under review.  
 
In summary, the analysis of all land transactions during the review period in the 
specified registration divisions on average revealed a relatively high level of activity – 
1,841 transactions amounting to 2,027,848 hectares, of which 35 were for the 
purposes of land reform and amounted to 274,110 ha.  
 
The study found that while a great deal of land market activity was evident, the land 
availability and level of activity was not even across all registration divisions or within 
a single registration division, as evidenced by the 3 case studies where land 
availability and market activity was very limited and in some instances static. While 
the lack of land availability indicated in the three case studies was not found to be 
generalised across all registration divisions, which were generally found to have 
considerable market activity, this uneven distribution of land availability remains a 
policy challenge to market-based land reform. 
 
Furthermore, given that 23% of the total transactions for this period were for non-
purchased land (for example, inherited estates), only 77% of all transactions can be 
viewed as involving land that was potentially available on the open market for 
acquisition by new entrants or other buyers.  
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The study found that while there was considerable land market activity, this in itself 
did not provide sufficient opportunities for land reform beneficiaries or resource-poor 
land-seekers to engage in the land market.vii This finding therefore suggests that 
there were other obstacles which prevented prospective beneficiaries from 
accessing the market in order to acquire land – these are addressed below. 
 
Interactions and relationships of negotiation and exchange  
 
The land market and the willing seller/buyer construct of market-based land reform 
are predicated on the presence of relationships of negotiation and exchange within 
the sphere of the market. This study provides an insight into the nature of the 
interactions between willing sellers and buyers and the impact of social relations on 
market access, with an emphasis on the socially embedded nature of land ownership 
and transactions (Akram-Lodhi, 2007), as outlined in Chapters One and Two.  
 
Profile of landownership  
In order to better understand the nature of the interactions and relationships of 
negotiation and exchange in the research sites, a profile of existing landownership 
was developed. This provided insights into whether land concentration and 
accumulation might impact on the amount of land that was potentially available for 
land reform transactions in the market.  
 
In the absence of an available government land audit, the study developed a profile 
of those who acquired land during the period under review. The data for both 
purchased and non-purchased transactions across the research sites was grouped 
according to the different types of buyers – these included companies, private 
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landowners, trusts, game parks, municipalities, churches, communities and para-
statals, amongst others. The land transactions are reflected in Table 7 below in 
terms of the number of buyers in each category for each registration division and the 
amount of land acquired by each category. 
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Table 7: Categories of buyers/new owners and amount of land acquired by them: 1998-2002 
 
 
Categories of  
new owners 
 
Piketberg 
 
Clanwilliam 
 
Vanrhynsdorp 
 
Calvinia 
 
Namaqualand 
Total  # of 
transactions per 
category. 
Total ha 
transacted in 
each category 
No:  No:  ha No:  No:  ha No:  No:  ha No:  No:  ha No:  No:  ha No:  No:  ha 
Company 91 21,789 113 43,976 87 70,628 32 53,221 40 105,390 363 295,003 
Family Trust 69 25,921 35 11,657 67 37,844 29 36,601 19 28,792 219 140,814 
National Parks 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 27,401 22 45,395 28 72,796 
Church 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.1 1 8.1 
Municipality 2 1.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 63,697 31 63,698 
Private owner 99 28,885 101 205,462 166 102,643 252 432,355 188 242,359 806 1,011,704 
Trusts: 
Combination of 
Private Trust, 
Company Trust & 
Family Trust 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2,187 
1 
2,187 
Trust: Combination 
of Private & 
Family Trust 
4 1,913 5 4,136 1 6.2 0 0 1 1.1 
11 6,056 
Trust (unspecified) 72 28,018 73 23,876 53 38,296 63 77,357 22 63,595 283 231,142 
Workers' Trust 1 5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5.5 
Private + Trust 2 1,129 10 15,153 1 490 4 274 0 0 17 17,046 
Family Trust + 
Shareholders 
6 1,033 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
1,033 
Community 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 10,379 5 10,379 
Transitional Council 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 168,678 30 168,678 
Company Trust 1 0.1 3 194 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 194 
Private and 
Company 
0 0 6 1,656 6 850 0 0 
0 
0 
12 
2,506 
Province (Sect. 
239-200/93) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4,304 0 0 
5 
4,304 
Parastatal 
(Transnet) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 18 298 0 0 
18 
298 
TOTAL: 347 108,695 346 306,110 381 250,757 409 631,810 358 730,482 1841 2,027,853 
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This data is further analysed in Figure three below, indicating the percentage share 
of each ownership type in relation to the total number of transactions. 
 
 
Figure 3: Categories of buyers/new owners as percentage share of total transactions: 1998-2002 
 
 
The data revealed that the majority of transactions involved private individual 
owners, and in this case, 806 transactions or 44% of the total number of 
transactions. This was followed by company owners at 363 transactions, or 20% of 
the total transactions. The data indicates a high level of land concentration in private 
and corporate hands. 
 
A consideration of the buyer profile of company ownership across the five 
registration divisions revealed that the most purchases by companies were to be 
found in the divisions of Clanwilliam (31%), followed by Piketberg (25%), 
Vanrhynsdorp (24%), Namaqualand (11%) and Calvinia (9%), thereby suggesting a 
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lower prevalence of capital intensive farming and more family farms in the 
Namaqualand and Hantam Karoo areas.  
 
Calvinia (31%) and Namaqualand (23%) showed the highest number of private 
buyers, with figures for Vanrhynsdorp indicating that 20% of all buyers were private 
individuals. Figures for the West Coast regions are markedly lower, with Clanwilliam 
reflecting 13% and 12% of buyers in Piketberg being private individuals.  
 
Areas which involve more capital intensive agricultural production and agri-business, 
such as those in the West Coast areas, typically require substantial investment – this 
may explain the higher prevalence of company ownership in these areas. Another 
possible reason for the prevalence of company buyers is that as land becomes 
increasingly expensive and less affordable for individual private buyers, commercial 
farmers form consortiums and companies in order to buy land (Interview, Director, 
Farmer Settlement Unit, Western Cape Department of Agriculture. July 2003).  
 
The accumulation and concentration of land  
The information found on title deeds does reflect all the properties 
contemporaneously owned by a particular owner but does state whether owners own 
other parcels of land under the same title deed. (It was not within the scope of this 
study to undertake a comprehensive deed search of the entire deeds registry to 
ascertain the linkages between all properties owned by one owner.) Information 
regarding the ownership of property under the same title deed is indicated on the title 
deed under the heading: ‘Identity of new owners’ and is coded using the letters “O”, 
“A”, and “P”. The code “O” denotes the acquisition of a portion of land through 
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shared ownership of the property where each owner does not own other property 
under the same title-deed; “A” denotes the acquisition of a property by more than 
one owner each of whom has other property registered under the same title-deed; 
and “P” denotes the acquisition of a property owned by only one person who also 
owns other property under the same title-deed.  
 
Based on information contained in the title deeds under review, the study established 
a profile of buyers who owned at least one other tradable portion of land, albeit under 
the same title deed - thus providing an indication of whether buyers/new owners 
were existing landholders or new entrants to the land market, and the extent of 
possible land concentration and accumulation.  Table 8 below provides summary 
details of the identity of new owners of agricultural land in terms of the categories ‘O’, 
‘A’ and ‘P’ as defined above.  
Table 8: Identity of new owners of agricultural land: 1998-2002 
 
Identity of new 
owner 
Piketberg Clanwilliam Vanryhnsdorp Calvinia Namaqualand TOTAL in each 
category: 
O (no other 
property under 
same title deed) 18 9 11 14 48 100 
A  (more than one 
owner, each with 
other property 
under same title 
deed) 2 31 28 17 14 92 
P (only one new 
owner but with 
other property 
under same title 
deed) 195 179 196 274 131 975 
 
The combined categories of “A” and “P” show those properties whose owners 
(individually or jointly) own more than one portion of property under the same title 
deed. These combined categories constituted the majority of all the transactions 
within the scope of this study. The category “A” buyers (numbering 92) and the 
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category “P” buyers (975) constituted 1,067 buyers and accounted for 58% of the 
total 1,841 transactions that occurred in the period 1998 to 2002. This indicates that 
a minimum of 58% of all portions of land transacted in the period under review was 
acquired by owners who already owned at least one parcel of land, thereby 
indicating a relatively high concentration and accumulation of land in the hands of 
existing landholders. This profile implies that the potential opportunities for new 
entrants and non-landholders were reduced.    
 
This profile of land accumulation and concentration is confirmed by information 
gathered from community respondents, a number of whom indicated that many 
commercial farmers have more than one farm - in the Hondeklipbaai are it was 
alleged that some landholders own as many as ten farms. They felt that in a country 
where there is such an unequal distribution of resources, this is neither fair nor 
equitable (Interviews, Hondeklipbaai community members, 2003). Commenting on 
the extent of land accumulation in the Hantam Karoo, an emerging farmer said, “This 
is how capitalism and the free market system work. Most commercial farmers have 
more than one farm – some have about ten. The free market allows them to 
accumulate so much land while others cannot access any... The longer the land 
market stays closed in the way that it is, and the less change in land ownership that 
takes place, the more we will lose out ...” (Interview, July, 2003). 
 
Land accumulation was also commented on by a Municipal official, “There are also 
millionaires in Namaqualand who have thousands of hectares ... One particular 
farmer has more than 9 farms and he is always eager to buy up more farms as they 
are put up for sale. When local commercial farmers buy up all available land, usually 
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before the wider public even gets to hear about it, this leaves little chance for 
community people or emerging farmers to acquire this land, with or without the help 
of DLA and Agriculture (Personal interview with official of Kamieskroon Municipality. 
October 2003.) 
 
Implications of unequal social relations on the land market  
While acknowledging that there is a myriad of historical, behavioural and structural 
reasons for the unequal social relations in the South African countryside, the study 
attempted to analyse some of the behavioural ways, drawing on White’s analysis 
(1993:3), in which social relations were being maintained and the impact of this on 
land availability for land reform. A number of reasons for the very limited amount of 
land being made available for land reform were identified – these involved the 
interwoven issues of racism, power, class, notions of trust and reliability, the 
protection of the labour market, a perceived threat of competition, the notion that the 
land will not be well managed or maintained once transferred, and concerns about 
the land reform process and its administration.  
 
Racism, power and class 
According to Mbongwa et al (1996), the effects of Apartheid are still evident in the 
form of well-laid infrastructure networks and know-how built over many years with 
substantial state subsidisation. These social and economic networks persist, and 
have a significant impact on information sharing and market access and the nature 
of interactions which take place within the sphere of the market. 
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A number of community respondents highlighted their experience of racism during 
the course of their attempts to acquire land. In some instances, racism was 
described as taking an extreme form of prejudice, as reflected in a comment made 
by a commercial farmer to prospective land reform beneficiaries: “Not today, not 
tomorrow, never will I sell to non-Whites” (Interview, Community members, 
Brandvlei, 2001).  
 
A group of emerging farmers indicated that, “Racism still operates as an underlying 
reason for why commercial farmers oppose the land reform process and for why they 
are not prepared to sell land to emerging farmers. Racism plays a role in whether 
land reform happens or not – many commercial farmers don’t want coloured 
neighbours and so they put the price up or they just won’t sell to us” (Interview, 
Namaqualand, 2003). 
 
It was alleged by emerging farmers, and was reiterated by a DLA official and by 
NGO fieldworkers, that this scenario is frequently compounded by collusion and 
coercion from neighbouring commercial farmers who place pressure on sellers not to 
sell their farms for land reform purposes. This finding was confirmed by two officials 
in the Hantam Agricultural Union who said, “Some (commercial farmers) are positive 
while others are not. Some people will buy up a farm, even if they don’t really need it, 
just to keep Black people out. The old attitudes do still exist among some people” 
(Interview, office bearers of Hantam Landbou Unie, July 2003). 
 
An official in the Department of Labour commented on his perception of land as a 
source and signifier of power and as a reason for why it will not be made available to 
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those who are perceived as eroding existing power blocs: “The fact is that land is a 
symbol of power. They (white commercial farmers) are holding onto their remaining 
power of land ownership. If sellers find that there are emerging farmers involved or 
that it is for land reform, the price either goes up or the land is taken off the market” 
(Interview, Department of Labour, Calvinia, July 2003). This situation was the direct 
experience of members of the Brandvlei EFA who, having lost the opportunity to 
acquire a particular farm, attempted to explore the possibility of acquiring another 
farm and found that overnight the property was taken off the market once they had 
shown interest (Interview, September 2003). 
 
A number of commercial farmers explained their resistance to sell to land reform 
beneficiaries as a fear about a lack of maintenance of fences and the resultant 
destruction caused by wild predators and the theft of their own livestock. They 
indicated that they remained concerned about their neighbours having to contend 
with this problem once they had sold property to land reform beneficiaries. An official 
of the Department of Agriculture in Namaqualand suggested that, “Sometimes it gets 
translated as racism but I think the key issue is that of farm maintenance which 
causes tensions and objections – there is a serious problem with predatory animals 
such as jackals and rooikat in this area. If all the farmers do not maintain their 
fences, the livestock owned by neighbouring farmers’ can be attacked by wild 
animals. Emerging farmers do not always have money for maintenance and don’t 
always prioritise it; so it’s not so much a question of racism but rather concerns 
about maintenance” (Interview, August, 2003). 
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In some instances, potential sellers raised concerns about whether the land would 
be honoured as “a productive resource to provide food for the nation” (Interview, 
commercial farmer, Namaqualand, August 2003). 
 
In certain agricultural production sectors, the threat of competition was another 
possible reason for resistance being shown by some commercial farmers to land 
reform. As indicated by a land reform participant, “Commercial farmers are resistant 
to black people getting land and farming – they are particularly opposed to us 
farming rooibos tea because we are competition to them in what is still a fairly limited 
niche market” (Interview, Calvinia, 2003). 
 
Some respondents suggested that a 'lubricant' to enable interactions between willing 
sellers and prospective land reform beneficiaries is the perception of reliability and 
trustworthiness.  Outcomes of the interviews indicate that where there is a 
relationship, a level of trust, an understanding or a shared commitment to farming 
and producing from the land, the potential for existing commercial landowners to 
consider selling their land to land reform beneficiaries or assisting land-seekers to 
access land or shares in a share equity scheme is increased. An official of the Land 
Bank in Calvinia suggested that attitudes are slowly changing and that there is a 
gradual shift towards a more positive attitude being developed in some quarters to 
include new entrants in the market: “Establishing a relationship between small-scale 
farmers and commercial farmers is central to developing understanding, trust and 
co-operation, and changes in this regard can be detected. Two years ago there 
would have been resistance to a neighbouring farm being bought for land reform, but 
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now there’s a more positive attitude” (Interview, official of  Land Bank, October 
2003). 
 
Perceptions about the DLA as a buyer and transacting partner were expressed by a 
number of respondents. The study encountered a widespread perception amongst 
landowners, including both those who were potential willing sellers and those who 
had already embarked on a land reform transaction, that the DLA is itself an 
unreliable buyer or transacting partner, largely as a result of its protracted 
procedures, negotiating style and rigid project cycle (Interviews, members of 
Namakwa Farmers’ Union, commercial farmers, estate agent, August 2003). As a 
result, land reform has become discredited, as owners prefer to transact with buyers 
who have ready capital and who do not require what are perceived by sellers as 
“bureaucratic and lengthy procedures” (Interview, commercial farmer, 2003).  
 
The land reform process was said to be too sluggish in relation to the dynamics of 
the market - a local commercial farmer in the Hondeklipbaai area said, “You have to 
get your foot in the door quickly and early if you hear about farms on the market. 
DLA does not always act fast enough to get the land that is available ... the problem 
is that DLA doesn’t show interest or put in their offers quickly enough” (Interview, 
commercial farmer, Hondeklipbaai, November 2003). 
 
An official of the Department of Labour suggested that, “You can buy a cheap farm 
through an auction but the problem is that the DLA does not have a pool of money 
available that allows them to attend auctions. This is a very easy way to buy 
reasonably priced land but you have to be ready and be able to move quickly – the 
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DLA’s project cycle is too long and too slow” (Interview, official of Department of 
Labour, Hantam Karoo. July 2003). 
 
In the words of a Namaqualand estate agent, the lack of success in land reform can 
largely be attributed to the DLA’s systems and procedures:   
“The DLA process is too slow. The Department does not seem able to keep 
up with the pace of land transactions and sellers get frustrated. Sellers have 
now reached the point where they prefer to avoid negotiating with the DLA or 
making their land available for land reform simply because of the bureaucratic 
process and the long waiting period in between each phase of the transaction” 
(Interview, estate agent, Loeriesfontein, October 2003). 
 
The concerns raised about the unreliability of the DLA process and its lengthy 
timeframes had a direct impact on how prospective land reform beneficiaries were 
perceived and treated by prospective sellers. By association, the willing sellers’ 
perceptions of the lack of reliability on the part of the DLA were projected onto 
prospective land reform beneficiaries who were consequently viewed as ‘unreliable’. 
This perceived ‘unreliability’ became evident in instances where prospective land 
reform beneficiaries had managed to identify available land and engage in the initial 
negotiations with the seller (in accordance with the DLA’s policy procedures) but did 
not have the autonomy to engage substantively because they did not have any 
certainty about an available land reform grant allocation or the amount of such an 
allocation. Having established contact with willing sellers during the initial phase, 
based on inadequate information or commitment from the DLA, they then remained 
dependent on the outcomes of decisions within the DLA that were beyond their 
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control. They thus found themselves entering negotiations with willing sellers in the 
absence of having any clarity about their bargaining scope, and were consequently 
perceived as being “vague and unreliable” (Interview, commercial farmer, 
Namaqualand, 2003).  
 
This situation served to undermine the confidence of prospective land reform 
beneficiaries. For willing sellers to overcome their perception of unreliability and 
engage with prospective beneficiaries, they would have to view the negotiation as a 
‘transaction of a special type’ for which concessions would need to be made, delays 
accommodated and lengthy procedures or financing problems overlooked. This 
immediately casts land reform beneficiaries in a position where they would not be 
treated as equal players in the market and would be made to feel this during the 
negotiation process, thus perpetuating the existent unequal social relations. This 
sentiment is captured by a small-scale farmer from Namaqualand:  
“Everywhere you go, you are a beginner  - either in finding land on which to 
farm, entering the market, in terms of starting up on your own land, in terms of 
getting credit, in terms of being recognised and being included in the 
associations and groupings of farmers in the area. Somehow it feels like you 
will always be on the outside and not be viewed as a serious farmer in the 
area. Just one of the beginners, always ... and DLA doesn’t help us to get a 
foot up. People are now not so interested to sell to DLA, mainly because of all 
their delays and the problems they cause” (Interview, July 2003).  
 
Besides the perception of the time-consuming and unreliable transaction procedures 
of the DLA, the State’s introduction of legislation pertaining to land and labour issues 
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was also raised as a factor that did not endear commercial farmers to land reform 
and possibly led to a lack of co-operation and trust in terms of making land available. 
Examples of laws and policies which appeared to result in resistance and political 
hostility included the introduction of a minimum wage for farm workers, changes in 
property taxation, and the introduction of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 
(ESTA).  Anecdotal evidence suggested that land may be held back from land reform 
as a form of protest against these laws and policies and that the political hostility 
which this represented was projected onto aspirant land reform beneficiaries – many 
of whom are farm workers or occupiers under ESTA. A comment made by a 
commercial farmer in Namaqualand reflects this perception: 
“There are still things that bother commercial farmers and these impact on 
their attitude to land reform – an example is ESTA. This makes a lot of 
farmers want to oppose anything about land reform. There might be farmers 
who would be willing to sell or be interested in engaging in joint ventures or 
contract farming type arrangements but ESTA creates problems for them and 
so they shy away from getting involved. They do not want to be stuck with 
people on their land that they cannot get rid of” (Interview, 2003).   
 
A number of commercial farmers and representatives of organised agriculture 
indicated that they would feel more supportive of the land reform programme and of 
releasing land onto the market for this purpose if there was evidence of the 
necessary financial and resource support to beneficiaries, and the provision of post-
settlement support by the DLA or Department of Agriculture. Some commercial 
farmers expressed concern that in the absence of a developmental approach with 
the associated support for the infrastructure, maintenance and operational costs of 
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farming, there was the danger that many land reform initiatives would not be viable 
and that this would lead to soil degradation, land becoming unproductive, a lack of 
maintenance of necessary infrastructure, and ultimately that beneficiaries would “be 
set up to fail” (Interview, Hantam Landbou Unie, July 2003). While the rationale 
underlying these concerns is unclear, they may reflect general concern about the 
future of the agricultural sector and a potential decline in the productive use of land, 
as well as dissatisfaction with the negligible post-transfer support made available by 
the DLA to land reform beneficiaries.  
 
In summary, the study found that while there was a large pool of ‘willing buyers’ in 
the form of prospective land reform beneficiaries, the pool of ‘willing sellers’ who 
were prepared to sell land through the land market for land reform purposes was 
limited. The reasons for this are multiple but at base are due to the socially 
embedded nature of land transactions and the unequal social relations in the 
countryside which are perpetuated by a range of perceptions, many of which are 
based on prejudice.  This situation is compounded by the apparent level of 
incompetence demonstrated by the DLA in maximising opportunities to acquire land 
as it becomes available on the market. Given the reality of these unequal social 
relations and the inability of relevant government institutions to play an actively 
supportive role, it was found that the land market (in itself a structural manifestation 
of the unequal social relations) cannot be expected to play an equalising role in 
providing adequate access to resource-poor land seekers; thereby pointing not so 
much to market failure but to a policy failure in the State’s  adoption of the market as 
the central mechanism for land redistribution, albeit with accompanying ‘pro-poor’ 
elements. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the state’s policies were not 
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implemented consistently and in many instances, were not accompanied by 
adequate resource allocations or support measures as outlined in policy. 
 
Market accessibility and information access 
 
The extent to which the market is a closed or open one, and by implication 
potentially exclusive or inclusive, remains central to whether land acquisition by 
prospective land reform beneficiaries is enabled or hindered. Key to the accessibility 
of the land market is the extent of information access regarding available land for 
sale. 
 
Interviews with a wide range of informants suggested that the procedures for land 
sales across the research sites varied considerably, ranging from relatively ‘open’ 
processes that may be accessed by a wide public to relatively ‘closed’ or private 
processes that are known only to a select few.  
 
In many areas of the countryside there are few points of contact or exchange 
between white landowners and resource-poor land seekers, and there is a tendency 
for the latter to remain outside the information and social networks that exist 
amongst existing landowners, and to therefore have limited or no access to available 
information about land availability in the market.  
 
The study found that the State does not play a role in maintaining a register of 
available land. According to a Department of Agriculture official, “Advertising is done 
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by word of mouth. There’s no database of farms or those that are up for sale” 
(Personal interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, July 2003). 
 
While the study found that  there are specific types of land transactions that by their 
nature are ‘closed’, or private, such as the transfer of inherited estates, the study 
examined the extent to which the ostensibly ‘open’  or public facet of the land market 
in fact operates in a transparent and accessible manner.  
 
Interviews with estate agents in the study area revealed that they were aware of only 
a very limited number of transactions taking place on the open market that were 
publically advertised and could be accessed by members of the general public. In 
light of the level of activity reflected in the number of transfers registered with the 
Deeds Office, this perception of a limited number of advertised properties for sale 
indicates that the land market was essentially an internal or private one, with little 
information made available in the public domain and thereby, effectively excluding 
prospective land reform beneficiaries. 
 
An estate agent working in the Hondeklipbaai area suggested that land was very 
rarely sold on the open market in the area to the west of Garies and toward the coast 
of Namaqualand, and that most land that is sold in this area is sold by private 
arrangement.  He suggested that land in this area was owned by those with long 
term interests - such as the state, private sector and mining companies - and that “in 
the event of land becoming available, the word is put out amongst their network and 
it is snapped up by existing landowners ... the number of properties changing hands 
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is not large, and when sellers wish to sell, it is generally not made public” (Personal 
interview, estate agent, Loeriesfontein, November 2003). 
 
A member of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers’ Association was of the opinion that 
the sale of land in the Calvinina area is not usually an open and transparent process 
and says,  
“People who are selling, first offer their land to their family members and then 
the information is secretly shared internally with their friends. The local 
commercial farmers usually know that a farm is for sale long before anyone 
else finds out or even before it is advertised. The commercial farmers tell their 
‘connections’ and no one else really gets a chance before they are snapped 
up. We are on the outside of this network and so we don’t get to hear of land 
being available until it is already being bought by someone else, and usually 
someone who is part of the 'special group of connections’. But in some cases 
outsiders (those viewed as ‘socially acceptable’ and ‘financially trustworthy’) 
who have put the word out that they are looking for a farm can get in on the 
act – especially if money is not a problem for them, they can sometimes get 
first option” (Personal interview, member of Brandvlei EFA, October 2003). 
 
This sentiment was confirmed by a local government councillor in Piketberg who 
suggested that, “The land market in this area is essentially an internal market and 
available farms become known through word of mouth. It’s a case of ‘farms for 
friends’. When a brown person approaches a seller, the price goes up. There are 
some farmers who are well intentioned, but they are few” (Interview, local 
government councillor, Piketberg, 2003). 
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The lack of public information about available land was confirmed by an estate agent 
who suggested that if the market was more transparent and open, and if the 
advertising of available land were to be made more public, prospective land reform 
beneficiaries would be more able to access the limited land that does come onto the 
market (Personal interview, estate agent, Namaqualand, August 2003).  
 
A number of routes for advertising available land were identified, some being more 
open and transparent than others. It was found that in general, the process by which 
agricultural land is advertised involves an informal procedure which has evolved 
amongst existing landowners. Landowners will firstly offer the land to family 
members or neighbours, if they are on good terms. If these people are not 
interested, the property is advertised at a range of gatherings including farmers’ co-
operatives, agricultural unions and associations, or through social institutions such 
as the church. These advertisements may take the form of printed notices on bulletin 
boards, via the publications issued by these social institutions, or by word of mouth 
at meetings or informal discussions that take place in these formations.   Only if the 
land is not sold through these networks are the services of estate agents sought.  
Estate agents then embark on a formal sales strategy that as a rule places emphasis 
on buyer identification prior to public advertising (Personal interview, estate agent, 
Namaqualand, August 2003). Given the social location of most estate agents, it 
might be assumed that they would be inclined to initially identify buyers and 
advertise available land amongst those in their social network. In the event that there 
is no positive response, the land might only then be publically advertised or 
information supplied to prospective beneficiaries. Given that the latter do not usually 
participate in the same range of social institutions and networks as estate agents 
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and that these agents act as intermediaries and mediate the available information, 
this method of advertising can potentially exclude aspirant beneficiaries from 
accessing information about available land. 
 
The study found that owners and estate agents were more open about sharing 
information about available land if it was the type of land that was not highly sought 
after or was located in an area that was ‘undesirable’ for whatever reason.  An estate 
agent in the Piketberg area suggested that given the lack of expansion in the potato 
sector and the fact that there was not a high level of demand for farmland conducive 
to growing that particular crop, landowners were increasingly advertising this land 
more publicly on the open market. However, in the grain or wine-growing areas 
where the demand for a specific type of land is more intense, the land market tended 
to be an internal one where neighbours and friends were informed by word of mouth 
(Personal interview, estate agent, Piketberg, November 2003). It may therefore be 
assumed that there are potential opportunities for resource-poor land seekers to 
acquire certain types of land that are used by farming sectors that are proving to be 
less successful or profitable, or land that is in a more remote area or, as in the case 
of the Remhoogte farm in Brandvlei, surrounded by commonage land. 
 
While estate agents are occasionally sources of advertised land for sale, a number 
of estate agents said that the DLA tends to avoid utilising their services because of 
the commission to be paid on transactions. They suggested that this was unfortunate 
and that an agent may ultimately assist the DLA to purchase a farm for less, 
including the cost of the commission, because the agents have a working knowledge 
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of the property market, relative sales in the area, and are able to arrange valuations 
of properties. 
 
It was found that in some instances information was selectively shared by sellers and 
that estate agents might be informed of available land while certain government 
departments were not: “It seems that the estate agents are sometimes told by 
commercial farmers about available land but the Department of Agriculture is not told 
because the commercial farmers don’t want to engage in land reform projects and 
transactions because it takes too long and they have to wait for their money and for 
the deal to be finalised” (Community member, Hondeklipbaai, August 2003).  
 
However, there were indications that this modus operandi was showing signs of 
change - a Department of Agriculture respondent indicated that, “Estate agents are 
now starting to involve us. It is a relatively new thing and not to a very large extent 
yet. They are starting to approach the Department of Agriculture to tell them about 
available farms for sale” (Personal interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, 
July 2003). Small scale farmers cited cases in Klawer in the Matzikama District 
where estate agents assisted land reform groups and acted as intermediaries 
between the seller, the Land Bank and the buyers. In the Vredenberg area of the 
West Coast, land reform beneficiaries were apparently beginning to approach estate 
agents (Interview, small-scale farmer, Matzikama, 2003). According to an estate 
agent in the West Coast, “They have opted for this (the use of estate agents) 
because they say that this arrangement offers them a go-between who acts as a 
buffer between white sellers and themselves. There is, however, confusion amongst 
the parties as to who should be responsible for the payment of the agent’s 
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commission – the prospective land reform beneficiaries, the Land Bank, the 
Department of Agriculture or the DLA?” (Personal interview, estate agent, Piketberg, 
August 2003). 
 
In summary, the activity in the local land markets under review essentially 
constituted a closed market and information about available land was typically known 
to only a select few who had the necessary finance and formed part of the social 
network. This situation is borne out by the apparent limited public knowledge about 
available land by land-seekers and estate agents relative to the number of registered 
transactions taking place. The study found that the asymmetrical and segmented 
nature of information dissemination and access resulted in resource-poor land 
seekers remaining on the periphery of the land market. 
 
The availability of capital and financing  
 
While acknowledging the multiple challenges arising from the socially embedded 
nature of land transactions as well as the lack of available land in some areas, both 
of which militate against aspirant beneficiaries acquiring land, the study found that 
resource-poor land seekers, as a category of willing buyers, are constrained in their 
ability to engage in the land market because of their lack of access to finance and 
the limited land grants available to them. In the absence of sufficient security for a 
loan or adequate ‘own contribution’ in the event of an LRAD grant allocation, many 
aspirant buyers are rendered powerless and find themselves effectively excluded 
from the market.   
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As indicated previously, even those at the top-end of the buying market were 
showing signs of being unable to acquire land independently and were therefore 
establishing consortiums, trusts or companies in order to obtain capital for land 
acquisition and production activities (Interview, Director, Farmer Settlement Unit, 
Western Cape Department of Agriculture, July 2003, and as detailed in the findings 
above).  It can be assumed that if better-resourced landowners or prospective 
buyers were finding it difficult to amass sufficient capital to acquire land 
independently, prospective land reform beneficiaries would be finding it all the more 
difficult and prohibitive, more so due to the application process and limited size of 
grants available from the DLA. 
 
A number of respondents indicated that they were not viewed by banks as being 
credit-worthy in order to obtain either purchase or production loans because they 
had no collateral and the likelihood of them obtaining returns on their enterprises 
was limited, more especially during their initial phase of production. A Department of 
Agriculture extension officer said, “The Land Bank won’t always give loans to 
emerging farmers because they are not viewed as being credit-worthy. Very often, if 
they do get a loan, they have to repay the loan on a monthly basis as opposed to 
paying it off over a year. In the beginning or during lean months, when you do not 
have income from either wool or your harvest, then this is very difficult” (Personal 
interview, Department of Agriculture extension officer, Namaqualand, July 2003). 
 
The chairperson of the Hantam Landbou Unie stated that one of the key obstacles to 
emerging farmers acquiring land is the lack of finance and the difficulties involved in 
obtaining loans. “The interest on loans is too high for emerging farmers. They cannot 
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pay 10% interest. If you can’t pay interest on your loan, it usually means that you 
don’t in fact have enough money to farm and to keep going. What is the point in 
South Africa of giving people a piece of land if they have no capital and no means to 
work the land? You are just setting people up to get into more debt and to fail – in 
the long run this is not fair either” (Interview, chairperson of Hantam Landbou Unie, 
July 2003). 
 
DLA budget constraints and the impact on beneficiaries 
The allocation of state funds for the purposes of grants is fundamental to the 
effective implementation and functioning of the market-based approach to land 
reform. In spite of the policy intentions outlined in the White Paper on South African 
Land Policy (1997) regarding the need for support to be offered to prospective land 
reform beneficiaries to enable them to engage in the land market, the study found 
that during the period under review, the annual budget allocations for land reform 
were consistently less than 0.5% of the total national budget (Surplus People 
Project, 2003). The lack of adequate budget allocations for land redistribution and its 
associated grant systems was found to be hampering progress with land reform and 
preventing the acquisition of land by land-seekers and emerging farmers. An official 
of the Western Cape Provincial Department of Agriculture indicated that, “One of the 
biggest problems has been the budget constraints of the DLA.  This has affected 
how much money is available for land reform grants and the size of grant that a 
person can get. In my opinion, the LRAD grant is not enough to actually allow you to 
start farming and the situation ends up being unsustainable” (Personal interview, 
October 2003). 
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Due to the budget constraints experienced by the Western Cape Department of Land 
Affairs, progress with LRAD projects came to a virtual standstill due to the 
moratorium on all new applications for LRAD grants. (As a result of a shortage of 
funds, the Director of the Western Cape Provincial Land Reform Office issued a 
memorandum to the various District Assessment Committees on 4th March 2003 
informing them that he was instituting a moratorium on the acceptance of new land 
reform projects. Prior to this, the Minster of Land Affairs had instituted a moratorium 
on new land reform projects from July 1999 to April 2000. Thus in the space of three 
years, landless communities in the Western Cape were instructed not to submit their 
requests and proposals for land reform projects.) This had a very direct bearing on 
the ability of landless and emerging farmers to acquire land.  
 
When asked to comment on the moratorium on LRAD grants and the impact of this 
on the EFA’s ability to acquire land, a member of the Bergrivier EFA, said:  “We are 
stopped in our tracks before we even start, and soon our footprints in the dust are 
blown away and we are left, forgotten” (Personal interview, emerging farmer, 
Eendekuil, July 2003). In light of the moratorium, the Bergrivier EFA, having already 
identified available land under the curatorship of the Land Bank, were forced to seek 
private sector financial support. However, in spite of having obtained this support, 
they were still unable to acquire the land they had identified and applied for.  
 
It was suggested by a number of respondents that even those land-seekers who 
were eligible to obtain grants from the DLA, continued to face a range of challenges 
and in many instances were unable to acquire land. Their lack of access to credit or 
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grants and the inadequate national budget allocations for land reform have further 
complicated these challenges.  
 
Having outlined the challenge of accessing finance or grants for land acquisition, this 
study examined the market value and pricing of agricultural land in the five 
registration divisions under review and in relation to the affordability of land by land 
reform beneficiaries. 
 
A recurring, though sometimes contradictory, view expressed by a number of 
interviewees about the price of land was that land reform was causing prices to rise. 
Land reform was seen as leading to artificial pricing based on the belief that the state 
pays more for land than do the local commercial farmers. This claim is made, for 
example, in the government’s own review of the Redistribution Programme: 
“Marginal land is being bought at exorbitant prices, turning white landowners into 
instant millionaires” (DLA, 1999). While this may be true in a number of instances, it 
may also be the case that during the initial stages of the land reform programme, the 
DLA purchased land at higher prices than was necessary and may have led sellers 
to believe that they could sell at higher prices to the land reform programme. A 
representative of the Department of Agriculture in Namaqualand commented as 
follows: “It must be acknowledged that the first land reform process in this area went 
wrong because DLA paid high prices and so, from then on, the prices asked for land 
being offered to the DLA for land reform, have rocketed. Land prices are very high. 
Land reform has pushed prices sky high because DLA and the Parks Board initially 
paid the prices that were asked for – this was for grazing land – and so now people 
ask for high prices because they assume the government will pay. However, this is 
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no longer always the case” (Interview, official of the Department of Agriculture, 
Namaqualand. October 2003). 
 
A local commercial farmer suggested that, “Land reform has not put land prices up 
but land reform is a new factor in the equation and the DLA is therefore a new buyer 
in the market – they are an additional buyer and one that has a very thick cheque 
book, a cheque book that is fatter than most other buyers in the market” (Interview, 
commercial farmer, Namaqualand, 2003). 
 
Table 9 below details the price of all the transacted land per registration division and 
indicates an average price per hectare in each of the divisions. 
 
Table 9: The price of transacted land per registration division: 1998-2002 
Registration 
Division: 
Piketberg Clanwilliam Vanrhynsdorp Calvinia Namaqualand Total: 
Price of total 
transacted 
land 
R 98,914,781 R 53,349,533 R 75,276,262 R 4,154,440 R102224236 
R793,919,252 = 
total price of 
transacted land 
Average 
price per 
transaction 
R 710,409 R 514,595 R 890,861 R 228,307 R 285,542 
R431,243 = 
average price per 
transaction 
Average 
price per 
hectare 
R 2,341 R 537 R1, 345 R 150 R 140 R391 per ha 
 
 
An analysis of the price per hectare across the five registration divisions revealed 
that the average land price in the Piketberg area (R2,341 per ha) was more than  in 
Vanrhynsdorp (R1,345 per ha), followed by Clanwilliam (R537 per ha), Calvinia 
(R150 per ha) and Namaqualand (R140 per ha). On average, the prices per property 
were found to be above the maximum LRAD grant that any individual land reform 
‘willing buyer’ could obtain (R100,000), therefore implying that buyers would be 
forced to pool their grants. In Calvinia, which had the lowest average price per 
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transaction, this price was more than twice the maximum LRAD grant. In 
Vanrhynsdorp, the lowest average price per transaction was found to be almost nine 
times as much as the maximum grant, thus indicating that land acquisition by 
individuals or a small group would have been prohibitive.  
  
A number of respondents indicated that in the event that land was available, it was 
“too expensive” for them to purchase. A number of interviewees raised the issue of 
the price of land in relation to the financial capacity of the various land acquisition 
options available to them. A recurrent refrain was that the available land reform 
grants and the budget allocations given to DLA did not match prevailing land prices. 
Emerging farmers from a range of different associations and initiatives confirmed the 
view of a Brandvlei emerging farmer: “LRAD doesn’t work because the basic 
R20,000 grant is not enough. We can’t afford to get grants bigger than R20,000 
because we don’t have money or equipment and other things to put in as our own 
contribution. The market price for land in this area for a decent size farm is not 
covered by the LRAD grant and the Land Bank doesn’t give enough of a loan. The 
interest on Land Bank loans is too high and we have to tighten our belts in such a 
way that it just can’t really work for us. The interest squeezes us too hard. We then 
have to pay it back too soon and we end up living in debt for the rest of our lives. The 
poor just seem to get poorer, even if we use the options that are supposed to help us 
out of poverty” (Personal interview, emerging farmer, Brandvlei, October 2003). 
 
In some instances, land was viewed as “too expensive” because prospective buyers 
felt that the asking price was inflated and based on an unreliable valuation. Aliber 
and Mokoena (2000) highlight the potential for valuations to be purposefully inflated 
as a result of collusion between the valuator and the seller. The potential for this to 
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occur was noted in the current study where it was found that in some instances, 
those conducting the valuations were members of the farming community who may 
have had vested interests in maintaining good relations with landowners in the 
community on whom they rely for the bulk of their business. Concerns were also 
raised by respondents regarding the manner in which the valuation of the farm 
Remhoogte in the Hantam Karoo had been conducted (Interview, Brandvlei EFA, 
August 2003). 
 
A fundamental assumption about the functioning of the land market is that ready 
capital and finance will be available for purchasing land. However, the study found 
that access to credit and grants was very limited on the part of prospective 
beneficiaries, who in many instances were not viewed as being credit-worthy. The 
limited availability and size of the grants was also found to be inadequate in relation 
to land prices.  
 
The existence of a regulatory framework 
 
The South African state provides a framework to regulate the land market through 
the provision of a systematised deeds registry, financial services and systems, 
professional land surveyors and valuators, and legislation and policy.  
 
Land valuation for the purposes of land reform is part of the market and the state’s 
machinery for regulating land transactions The DLA bases its policies for land 
valuation on the principles outlined in the White Paper on South African Land Policy, 
the Constitution and various precedents and rulings of the Land Claims Court.  
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Prices paid for land bought for land reform by the DLA through its willing seller/buyer 
approach are based on the market value of the land. This principle is stipulated in 
the White Paper: “Where funds are used to subsidise the purchase of private land, 
the DLA and the Department of State Expenditure require that a fair price be paid. 
This will usually be ‘reasonable market value.’ This is defined as a price which is 
comparable with recent sales in the locality and one which is endorsed by an 
independent valuer and/or the Land and Agricultural Bank ... Government has a 
responsibility to ensure that state resources are used wisely and that prices 
negotiated are just and equitable” (DLA, 1997b:42).  
 
Aspirant buyers interviewed in this study suggested that if they were able to buy land 
at productive value rather than market value and had access to ‘soft loans’ or 
subsidies, they would be in a better position to acquire land.  
“The problem is that we have to buy at market prices and not productive 
prices ... DLA policy doesn’t accept this and nor do the farmers. We want an 
instrument that allows us to buy land at productive price with soft loans for a 
specific period of time. It seems unfair that for all these years whites have had 
land and farmed it, and did not pay cash for it and yet, we are forced to pay 
cash. We do not have the benefits of agricultural subsidies and support like all 
these farmers had in the past and yet, we are having to engage in farming at 
the same level with very little support” (Interview, emerging farmers, 
Namaqualand, 2003). 
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Introduction of legislation and taxation 
In addition to providing a regulatory framework for the land market, the state is also 
able to influence the land market through introducing legislation or altering levels of 
property taxation.  
 
At the time of writing, the government was debating the formulation of the Property 
Rates Bill of 2003. A number of respondents viewed this as potentially impacting on 
the amount of land that might be made available to the land market. A de Beers 
Mining Company representative indicated that, “We’ve realised that with the 
introduction of the Property Rates Bill it’s not going to be viable for us to keep 
ownership of a number of properties. This will prompt de Beers to sell off some of 
our property. The Agricultural Unions, Parks and small-scale farmers are interested 
in any of our available land and it is possible that some land will become available as 
a result of the introduction of increased taxes on our land” (Interview, de Beers Mine 
management, August 2003). The Kamiesberg Municipality echoed this sentiment: 
“The Bill will have a big impact because people won’t be able to afford to pay the tax 
and so will sell their properties” (Interview, September 2003). 
 
 
Land reform as a form of State intervention in the land market  
The land reform programme is one of the ways in which the State can influence the 
land market and act in the interests of those who are not automatically included in 
the sphere of the market.  
 
This study encountered widespread dissatisfaction and concern, amongst both 
prospective land reform beneficiaries and willing sellers, regarding the manner in 
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which the State was intervening in the land market through its land reform 
programme. These have been detailed throughout the study and are amplified by 
this comment by an official of the Department of Labour in the Hantam Karoo 
regarding the LRAD programme, as an element of land reform: 
“There needs to be a more aggressive drive to acquire land. All LRAD does is 
to give people hope but government needs to intervene and make it easier to 
get land. LRAD is not getting to the nuts and bolts – it just gives limited grants 
and provides limited access to a limited number of people with a limited 
number of livestock. Hope is important, but it’s not enough. The acquisition of 
land is very difficult for people and it can’t just be left to people to find and 
negotiate and sort out on their own – government must intervene more 
directly” (Interview,  official of Department of Labour, Hantam Karoo, July 
2003). 
 
An official of the Farmer Settlement Unit in the Department of Agriculture in the 
Western Cape acknowledged that:  
“Government processes are not streamlined in accordance with the needs of 
the client but in terms of the needs of government. Government cycles are out 
of synch with developments within LRAD. The government had not put 
personnel in place prior to LRAD being brought in. There is a need for a 
different kind of approach, a different kind of intervention and different staffing 
levels within the LRAD programme if we are going to meet the demands on 
land reform. To this end, more attention should be given to a more pro-active 
or supply-side orientation for land reform” (Interview, Director, Farmer 
Settlement Unit, Department of Agriculture, July 2003). 
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It was found that while the state had introduced land reform policy, insufficient 
attention was paid to advance the policy intentions and that there was a lack of a 
strategic plan for land reform on the part of most Municipalities, which are 
responsible for local development initiatives. The Acting Municipal Manager of the 
Hantam Municipality, which is responsible for the Brandvlei emerging farmers' 
initiative, indicated that the Municipality’s Integrated Development Plan (IDP) does 
not refer to land reform or to the acquisition of additional commonage. According to 
him the Municipality “has no specific strategy as such but land reform is always on 
our agenda. If land becomes available we will buy it, depending on DLA’s budget 
and capacity at the time” (Interview, Acting Municipal Manager, Hantam Municipality, 
October 2003). The case study of the Brandvlei Emerging Farmers’ attempt to 
acquire additional commonage points to the inadequacies in the State’s Municipal 
Commonage Programme and to the difficulties experienced by small-scale farmers 
and landless people in their attempts to acquire land through this programme via the 
land market. 
 
The study found that the difficulties encountered by aspirant farmers seeking 
commonage land were exacerbated by the following: 
● The Integrated Development Plans of municipalities generally did not 
include the acquisition of commonage, and municipalities lacked autonomy 
and financial bargaining power in relation to land reform; 
● The DLA’s procedures made the acquisition of land through this 
programme very difficult and time-consuming; 
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● Reliance on the availability of land on the open market frequently led to 
stasis in the acquisition of land and the stalling of the Commonage 
Programme. 
 
In summary, the study found that in the absence of further support and an over-
arching recognition of the deeply embedded social inequalities that exist, the land 
reform grants are very limited and insufficient to address land need and the profound 
socio-economic differences amongst sellers and buyers in the market. 
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Chapter Six – Conclusion  
 
Despite South Africa’s transition to democracy and the constitutional commitment to 
a more equitable redistribution of land, this study found that market-based land 
reform policies implemented by the state since 1994 are not meeting the needs of 
many resource-poor land-seekers in the Northern and Western Cape.  The evidence 
of this local study reflects the national picture of a generally slow pace of land 
redistribution – by the end of 2007, the South African government had redistributed 4 
percent of white-owned commercial agricultural land, thus reaching the target of 30 
percent redistribution by 2014 highly unlikely (IRIN, 2007). The Department of Land 
Affairs noted in its annual report for 2006-2007 that it faced “a serious challenge" in 
meeting its 2014 target (DLA, 2007). This serious challenge has been precipitated by 
a number of factors, of which the general reliance on the market and the particular 
manner in which the DLA has approached – and expects others to approach – the 
land market are amongst the most significant.  
 
A number of the factors leading to this “serious challenge” and the lack of progress in 
meeting the target were found to have their roots in the politics of the State’s 
adoption of market-based land reform in the early 1990s; the absence of a clear 
characterisation of the land market in South African land reform policy and the 
implications of this for implementation; and the nature and level of support provided 
to prospective beneficiaries by the Departments of Land Affairs and Agriculture and 
associated agencies.  
 
Having adopted market logic as the cornerstone of the land reform programme, while 
at the same time recognising that the land market on its own is an inadequate 
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mechanism for land redistribution in response to the Apartheid legacy of land 
dispossession, South African policy makers introduced a corrective in the form of 
‘bureaucratic action’ (Bernstein, 1994:1) through the introduction of land grants and a 
limited suite of support arrangements. The outcome of the adoption of market-based 
land reform and its failure to address land need and reach the intended targets, 
would seem to contradict the policy intentions and assumptions about the reliability 
of the land market as the central mechanism for land redistribution and the efficacy 
of the state’s support initiatives in the form of land reform grants and technical 
assistance to resource-poor land seekers. 
 
This study highlights a number of the contradictions and a mismatch between the 
claims made for the hybridised market-based land reform programme and the 
experience of resource-poor land-seeking people in the Western and Northern Cape. 
This mismatch essentially reflects a lack of integration of the assumptions held by 
policy makers regarding ‘market logic’ and their response to the inadequacies of this 
logic in the form of ‘bureaucratic action’; a lack of convergence of policy intentions 
underpinned by a set of assumptions about the role and capacity of the market 
(whether viewed in idealised or pragmatic terms) and the state’s ability and 
preparedness to provide and implement sufficient and appropriate assistance for the 
purchasing and redistribution of land.  
 
These contradictions became evident through the analysis of the title-deed data of all 
agricultural land transactions across the research site during the period under 
review. The data revealed that while there was a considerable level of market 
activity, the Apartheid demographic profile of land ownership was not significantly 
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altered and land acquisition for the purposes of land reform was very limited. While 
land was not evenly available across or within all the research sites, opportunities for 
land acquisition remained the preserve of those who had the appropriate knowledge, 
access to networks and resources at their disposal, namely existing landowners and 
those who had the independent wherewithal to engage in the market. The three case 
studies attest to a lack of available land for land reform purposes in their respective 
localities and a lack of preparedness on the part of the Department of Land Affairs 
and the Land Bank to advance the interests of resource-poor land seekers and 
prospective beneficiaries. 
 
While market failure, static markets, the range of reasons as to why ‘willing sellers’ 
might not be prepared to sell to prospective land reform beneficiaries, and limited 
budget resources, amongst others, have all served to retard land reform, the study 
found that the DLA had not made use of its policy options such as expropriation or 
sub-division in order to realise land redistribution and neither had it shown a 
commitment to advance the interests of prospective land reform beneficiaries by 
conducting its administrative procedures more efficiently and effectively.  
 
In part, the financial capacity of the DLA to acquire land might be excused by the 
lack of financial resources and national budget allocations, which in turn is ultimately 
indicative of a lack of political will or prioritisation of land reform at the highest 
political and administrative level. Even so, the study found that where DLA funds 
were available, where the Land Bank was in a position to further the interests of land 
reform applicants, and where land was available on the market, these opportunities 
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were not actively pursued – as evidenced by the Brandvlei and Bergrivier case 
studies. 
 
This study cites instances of slippage between policy and its operationalisation and 
of potential land market transactions being frustrated due to, for example, racism and 
prejudice on the part of ‘willing sellers’ who refuse to sell for the purposes of land 
reform, as witnessed in a number of instances, more specifically that of the Brandvlei 
case study. The study highlights a lack of available land, as indicated in all three 
case studies and particularly that of Hondeklipbaai; an inadequate level of 
information about land sales; a lack of preparedness on the part of the DLA to 
actively engage and assert its bargaining power in the market; and lengthy delays in 
concluding land reform negotiations, amongst others. These difficulties have 
invariably been rationalised and variously explained by the DLA as ‘market failure’ or 
the intransigence of ‘willing sellers’ and their attempts to increase prices. Besides 
appearing to have not made the link between the dynamic of ‘market failure’ and the 
behaviour of ‘willing sellers’, the DLA has not adequately addressed these 
challenges or taken responsibility for the lack of progress with land redistribution – as 
further evidenced by its unwillingness to utilise the provisions of expropriation or sub-
division. If the State had come to the conclusion that the slow pace of land reform 
was the result of ‘market failure’ – as indicated by Minister Thoko Didiza (2000) in 
her address to Parliament in February 2000 in which she outlined the key problems 
facing land reform and stated that market forces "as core redistributive factors have 
not produced the desired effects and impact", and in response to the outcomes of 
the Land Summit held in 2005 – a more appropriate approach would have been for 
the State to either abandon the market-based approach altogether or to develop 
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strategies that would overcome the range of obstacles faced by new entrants to the 
market. It appears to have chosen to do neither. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that the gap between the promise of South Africa’s 
constitutionally-sanctioned land reform programme and the experience of 
prospective land reform beneficiaries represents not so much a problem of market 
failure but of policy failure. In adopting the market-based approach, the South African 
state can either be viewed as having been unaware of the realities of the land market 
and of the multiple forms of exclusion and disadvantage experienced by the rural 
poor and landless, or it can be viewed as having knowingly adopted a market-based 
approach to land reform (albeit presented in the trappings and framed in the rhetoric 
of a more comprehensive form of redistribution) as part of its neo-liberal agenda and 
in a bid to minimise the antagonism of the interests of big business and foreign 
investors, with the understanding that market-based land reform would not lead to a 
radical or comprehensive reorganisation of land ownership and control. However, it 
cannot be argued that the state was oblivious to the realities of the market or to the 
level of disadvantage of the rural poor, as attested to in a range of policy documents 
such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) and the White 
Paper on Land Policy (1997b). One can therefore conclude that the latter scenario is 
more likely to be the case – the adoption of market-based land reform is aligned to 
the state’s neo-liberal agenda and is not intended to facilitate comprehensive land 
reform or address the land need of the resource-poor and dispossessed to a 
significant degree. It is therefore suggested that the policy choices on the part of the 
state have resulted in the slow pace of land redistribution and the associated 
difficulties encountered by resource-poor land seekers in their attempts to acquire 
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land. The failings of the South African land reform programme and the lack of land 
acquisition by the resource-poor should therefore not be explained as market-failure, 
albeit that the failings of the market do play a contributory role, but rather as the 
failure of political policy choices made during the 1990s and adhered to into the 
twenty-first century – the failure of land redistribution and the numerous obstacles 
faced by resource-poor land-seekers are a direct result of policy failure and the 
abdication of responsibility for land reform on the part of the State and its policy 
designers. It should be no surprise to policy-makers that markets, by their very 
nature, fail and that in doing so, it is the poor and marginalised who invariably 
become the casualties. The policy designers of South African market-based land 
reform, having wittingly adopted the market as the central mechanism for land 
redistribution, have come to rationalise the failure of their policy choices and practice 
by blaming the market. 
 
Interestingly, in as early as 1994, Bernstein (1994) suggested that the World Bank 
(viewed by many as the bastion of conservative proponents of the market economy) 
had consistently advocated a more comprehensive land reform programme for South 
Africa than that adopted by the ANC and had called for an increased level of support 
to beneficiaries than that provided by the South African state (Van den Brink, 2002). 
It would seem that the post-Apartheid government made a policy decision not to 
accommodate the real needs of resource-poor land-seekers but rather to protect its 
neo-liberal interests and those of the existing landowning and agricultural sector, 
while at the same time presenting its land reform policy in the language of radical 
change.  
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This abdication and devolution of responsibility for land redistribution through the use 
of the land market mechanism has meant that the potential for confrontation between 
existing land owners and the resource-poor who are currently asserting their land 
need, has been deflected from a centre-stage national confrontation between the 
State and landowners to a decentralised, localised and less visible interaction 
between landowners and resource-poor individuals or groups, equipped only with the 
promise of a limited grant and a degree of technical support. The decentralisation of 
land redistribution has also placed additional burdens and responsibilities on aspirant 
individual and group beneficiaries, as they are required to identify available land and 
initiate negotiations in the absence of adequate expertise or support. 
 
In formulating South Africa’s market-based land reform policy, very little 
characterisation of the land market or the ways in which the South African land 
market (or land markets more generally) operate in practice was articulated or 
documented in policy papers. As a result, no strategies have been developed for 
dealing with critical issues such as how to stimulate supply in conditions of extreme 
land scarcity, how to overcome information shortages among buyers, how to address 
racial and other biases among sellers, or how to deal with discrepancies between 
‘market value’ and the prices actually demanded by landowners or the affordability of 
these by the rural poor. Rather, it appears that the nature and role of the land market 
was viewed by policy makers as axiomatic and unproblematic. As long as the 
historically disadvantaged were provided with funds – rationed through various 
bureaucratic and budgetary processes – they could be expected to avail themselves 
of opportunities provided by the market and thus meet their land needs. In effect, the 
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state framed land reform policy as essentially a financial and technical response to a 
deep-seated and complex political challenge that runs to the core of South Africa’s 
highly unequal and stratified society. Kariuki and Van der Walt (2000) suggest that 
by ignoring the potentially profound implications of power differentials in the market, 
the ANC government “dress(ed) up a process of actually buying back land, originally 
acquired in highly unjust circumstances, as a program of redistribution to the poor” 
and following Bernstein (1994), framed the political act of land redistribution in terms 
of a more neutralised “assisted purchase”. 
 
In the absence of a clear characterisation of the land market, those responsible for 
implementing policy – such as local officials of the national Department of Land 
Affairs, the provincial Department of Agriculture, the Land Bank, local municipalities 
and prospective beneficiaries – have been left to interpret the nature of the land 
market, and their role in it, according to the prevailing orthodoxy in their locale at any 
given point in time. The study detected a range of myths, perceptions and 
assumptions on the part of land sector policy makers, officials and implementers 
which, in a number of instances, included viewing the market in accordance with 
abstracted and idealised neo-classical principles rather than those more realistically 
aligned to the workings of real markets. Partially arising from this lack of analytical 
attention to the character of the market, the study detected what can be described as 
a ‘reverential’ attitude to the market on the part of some state officials and support 
agents who ascribed it with an almost mystical quality. A prime example of this being 
the view expressed by an official of the Northern Cape PLRO who suggested that 
the acquisition of the farm Remhoogte at R5 per hectare more than the initial and 
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outdated asking price would have meant that the government was “deliberately 
frustrating the land market”. Another example was the perception of a local estate 
agent that SANParks was prepared to purchase land in the Garies region of 
Namaqualand at almost any cost and that this served to “destabilise” the market. 
This attitude suggests an assumption that the market is an idealised abstraction 
outside the realm of everyday interaction, rather than a site of struggle or a reflection 
of complex and historically determined social relations. In other words, the market is 
viewed as an idealised institution that has its own internal momentum and 
equilibrium that should not be impacted upon by real needs, vested interests or 
external factors of power, ownership or control. This notion of “destabilisation” and 
“distortion” generates the impression that any activity in the market that is not viewed 
as being in the interests of a particular grouping or dominant power bloc might be 
expediently represented as unsettling the market.   
 
This reverential attitude, and the idealised notion of the market on which it rests, was 
found in this study to have been used by some officials to justify their reticence or 
refusal to actively intervene in the process of acquiring land for beneficiaries, in the 
belief that this would ‘destabilise’ or ‘distort’ the market – as evidenced by the 
Brandvlei and Hondeklipbaai case studies.  
 
However, the study found that the lack of characterisation of the land market and the 
scope for interpreting the market according to individual preference or the prevailing 
orthodoxy of a particular DLA office or group of officials, did not result in this 
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reverential attitude being uniformly held; there were some government officials that 
were more assertive about the need to maximise the opportunities created by the 
market to acquire land for land reform purposes – witness the comments made by an 
official of the Department of Labour in the Hantam Karoo regarding the LRAD 
programme, as an element of land reform, “There needs to be a more aggressive 
drive to acquire land”. This was reiterated by an official in the Department of 
Agriculture in the Western Cape who acknowledged that:  
“Government processes are not streamlined in accordance with the needs of 
the client but in terms of the needs of government ...There is a need for a 
different kind of approach, a different kind of intervention ... if we are going to 
meet the demands of land reform. To this end, more attention should be given 
to a more pro-active or supply-side orientation for land reform” (Interview, 
Director, Farmer Settlement Unit, Department of Agriculture, July 2003).  
 
The lack of characterisation of the market in policy frameworks has served to 
generate confusion about the scope and purpose of the DLA’s procedures and 
support provisions, and has resulted in a range of inconsistently held interpretations 
about how the land market may or may not be used to advance the interests of 
aspirant beneficiaries. 
 
While the principal difficulties confronting aspirant land reform beneficiaries in the 
study area were found to be the exclusionary – and at times non-existent – nature of 
the land market, a second set of problems became evident and is based on the 
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nature and timing of the support or intervention provided by the DLA, the Department 
of Agriculture, and the Land Bank. This set of problems includes, firstly, a failure on 
the part of the DLA to intervene in areas where a land need was expressed but 
where no land was available on the market. In the event of a static market or 
temporarily non-existent market, such as in Hondeklipbaai, the DLA did not intervene 
to correct this ‘market imperfection’ and the real land needs of the community 
remained neglected. In the words of a Hondeklipbaai resident, “DLA and the 
Department of Agriculture do not help us find land ... if there’s no willing seller then 
that’s just too bad” (Interview, August 2003). 
 
Secondly, the limited size of the land reform grant relative to the price of land was 
repeatedly referred to by respondents of this study as undermining the possibility of 
aspirant beneficiaries engaging in the land market – as evidenced by community 
members in the Hantam Karoo and West Coast who variously confirmed the view of 
a Brandvlei emerging farmer that:  
 
“LRAD doesn’t work because the basic R20,000 grant is not enough. We can’t 
afford to get grants bigger than R20,000 because we don’t have money or 
equipment and other things to put in as our own contribution. The market 
price for land in this area for a decent size farm is not covered by the LRAD 
grant and the Land Bank doesn’t give enough of a loan ... The poor just seem 
to get poorer, even if we use the options that are supposed to help us out of 
poverty” (Personal interview, emerging farmer, Brandvlei, October 2003). 
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In attempting to overcome the challenge of the small size of the grant, aspirant 
beneficiaries resorted to establishing groups in order to pool their grants. In the 
absence of being able to find affordable land as individuals, the Bergrivier group 
decided to join forces and pool their grants in order to make an offer to purchase the 
farm Goergap. They were, however, mindful of the potential problems that can 
emerge from such an arrangement, in particular, the danger that, once purchased, 
the productive capacity of the land would not necessarily provide sufficient income 
for the large group of beneficiaries. Other respondents, including those from 
Hondeklipbaai and Brandvlei, indicated that even if they were to pool their grants, the 
amount of the grant would still be insufficient to purchase the land that was available. 
This was cited by the small-scale farmers in Brandvlei as a key reason for opting for 
Commonage land through the Municipal Commonage programme. 
 
Thirdly, the DLA’s limited budget and its reticence to accommodate a minimal 
increase in land price – partly due to its reverential attitude to the land market – as 
shown in the case of the Brandvlei application to purchase the farm Remhoogte, 
served to truncate any possibility of acquiring land by the aspirant beneficiaries.  
 
Fourthly, and linked to the previous issue, the interruptions to the flow of funding, as 
in the case of the moratorium on all grant applications in the Western Cape, 
compounded by the apparently unsympathetic response on the part of the Land 
Bank, served to undermine the attempts of aspirant beneficiaries to acquire land – as 
in the case of the Bergrivier Emerging Farmers Association’s attempt to acquire the 
farm Goergap.  
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Fifthly, the general administration within DLA and its apparently prolonged 
bureaucratic procedures served to frustrate both the willing sellers and aspirant 
beneficiaries, and frequently resulted in the DLA losing credibility on the part of those 
who had initially been willing to engage in land reform initiatives, as evidenced by 
comments from respondents such indicating that: 
 
“The DLA process is too slow. The Department does not seem able to keep 
up with the pace of land transactions and sellers get frustrated. Sellers have 
now reached the point where they prefer to avoid negotiating with the DLA or 
making their land available for land reform simply because of the bureaucratic 
process and the long waiting period in between each phase of the transaction” 
(Interview, estate agent, Loeriesfontein, October 2003). 
 
The documented case studies and experiences of resource-poor rural people’s 
attempts to engage in the land market to acquire land in the arid regions of 
Namaqualand and the Hantam Karoo in the Northern Cape, and in the better-
resourced West Coast of the Western Cape, starkly expose the nature of the 
challenges faced by them and the failings of the state’s market-based policy to 
address their land need.  Each of their stories tells a different tale but with a shared 
and constant refrain – distress about the manner in which land is valued as a 
commodity by the market; frustration and despair about the lack of available land; 
exclusion from the land market due to historical and socio-economic inequalities; 
non-existent or inadequate financial resources and insufficient support from the 
State.  
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In summary, the study found that the key elements necessary for the land market to 
function, as synthesised in this study, were in general absent, more specifically 
within the three case study locations, and that while numerous obstacles confronted 
historically disadvantaged people when trying to acquire land on the market, these 
were compounded by the implementation strategies and bureaucratic procedures 
and action of the DLA, the Land Bank and associated land reform structures. As 
evidenced by the three case studies, the availability of land for land reform purposes 
was extremely limited; the number of ‘willing sellers’ who were prepared to sell their 
land for the purposes of land reform were negligible; the potential for relationships of 
transaction to develop, more especially based on trust, was highly unlikely given the 
socially-embedded nature of race and class relations in most rural areas; the lack of 
information available to resource-poor land-seekers meant that even when land was 
available, it was difficult for them to find out about it; the limited grants, budget 
constraints and the moratorium on grant applications retarded the ability of aspirant 
beneficiaries to acquire land; and where opportunities did exist for the State to 
intervene in the market, in the event that land was for sale and willing sellers were 
prepared to sell for land reform purposes, the DLA failed to take advantage of these 
opportunities in the interests of aspirant beneficiaries.  A dominant message 
emerging from the study is that of the inadequacy and inappropriate nature and level 
of support which the state provides to enable market access and land acquisition by 
resource-poor land seekers.  
 
In essence, the level of support by means of limited financial allocations and 
technical assistance, as detailed above, suggests that policy designers and 
proponents of the land market were either incorrect in assuming that this limited 
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support provided by the State would have the capacity to remedy centuries of social 
inequality, or wittingly advocated such a policy approach in the knowledge that it 
would not advance the interests and needs of the majority of aspirant land reform 
beneficiaries, and thereby protect the interests of existing landowners, agri-business 
and foreign investors. Overcoming the realities of a socio-politically entrenched land 
market clearly demands more than the provision of grants or credit.   
 
The study found that amongst the various ways in which the land market has been 
characterised and interpreted, the predominant and idealised notion of the land 
market as a neutral, fair and apolitical institution is not congruent with the reality of 
markets as experienced by under-resourced land-seekers. It was found that the 
policy choice of adopting the land market is itself flawed in that the market does not, 
and by its very nature cannot, respond to real need and that its modus operandi in 
effect serves to inhibit land redistribution and maintain the status quo of land 
ownership. The acquisition of land by resource-poor land seekers via the land 
market thus remains an illusory, elusive and frustrating abstraction. 
 
The portrayal of the land market in land reform legislation and policy as a technical 
mechanism for the transaction of land, devoid of historical and political substance 
and divorced from the socio-economic dynamics of South African and global 
realities, is an idealised abstraction. This misrepresentation has served to bewilder 
and mislead many rural land-seekers who desperately strive to have their land and 
survival needs met but who remain frustrated in the face of little progress. Until such 
time that it is acknowledged that real markets are social amalgams interacting with 
and pervaded by the state and society at large, and are political entities permeated 
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by power relations of diverse kinds, following White’s characterisation (1993), and 
that the land market is essentially a site of struggle and contestation in the battle for 
land and power, resource-poor land seekers will continue to grasp at a mirage that 
remains out of their reach. Sadly, it may be the case that the elusive nature of land 
acquisition by resource-poor land-seekers through the market-based land reform 
programme is the underlying, though not articulated, intention of much of the South 
African state’s land reform policy agenda. 
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Endnotes 
___________________________________ 
 
i.The Washington Consensus is a term, initially coined in 1989 by John Williamson, to 
describe a relatively specific set of ten economic policy prescriptions that he believed 
constituted a "standard" reform package to be promoted for developing countries by 
Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the United States of America's Treasury Department. The term has since been used to 
describe a range of principles and policies that are broadly associated with expanding the 
role of market forces and constraining the role of the state and allied to the principles of 
neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism.  
 
ii.Prior to the constitutional negotiations, the bulk of all commercial agricultural land in South 
Africa was owned and controlled by the white minority and the economy was highly 
centralised and regulated, with commercial agriculture for decades having been bolstered 
by a suite of subsidies, loans, controls and protections (Williams, 1996:152). 
 
iii.A registration division, formerly known as an Administrative Division, is a designated land 
area defined by squares of latitude and longitude and which falls under a specific 
magisterial district. It enables the identification and location of specific parcels of land as 
registered in the Deeds Office for that province or relevant jurisdiction. 
 
iv.Neoclassical economic theory posits that markets are the best mechanisms for allocating 
resources and are most effective when left alone without government or corporate 
interference. 
 
v.Each district municipality has a district level, District Assessment Committee (DAC) to 
assess proposed projects. LRAD applications are presented and discussed at DAC forums 
and recommendations made for the consideration of the DLA provincial grant approval 
committee. 
 
vi.Given that no validated land audit is available, these figures are offered as a rough estimate 
of all agricultural/rural land in each registration division. The figures for the total amount of 
agricultural/rural land were arrived at by subtracting all town allotments from the total land 
area for each registration division, based on figures obtained from the Surveyor General’s 
Office in Cape Town. The following total areas of agricultural/rural land were thus estimated 
for each registration division: Clanwilliam: 729,708 ha; Piketberg: 445,600 ha; 
vanRhynsdorp: 1,248,778 ha; Calvinia: 8,69 million ha; Namaqualand: 5,26 million ha. 
 
vii.While it was not within the scope of this study and active verification was not sought, no 
anecdotal evidence was found of black South Africans acquiring land outside of the land 
reform programme. 
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